

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

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## Contributors to This Issue

E. SARKISYANZ, an Iranian national by birth, attended the University of Teheran and received a Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago; he is the author of a number of articles on the problems of Russia's relationship to the Orient and has completed a work, *Russian Ideals and the Messianism of the Orient: A Study in Political Chiasm*, which is to be published by the Mohr Verlag, Tübingen, Germany.

CONSTANTINE KRYPTON is a refugee Soviet scholar formerly connected with the Leningrad Institute for the Study of the North; since 1952 he has been a Fellow of the East European Fund's Research Program on the USSR and has written books and monographs on the Soviet North and the North Sea Route, as well as a book of reminiscences on the siege of Leningrad (in Russian).

MAURICE FRIEDBERG received an M.A. degree in Slavic studies in 1953 and a certificate of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, where he is currently working for his doctorate.

XENIA J. EUDIN is Research Associate at the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University. Her book, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927*, is to be published shortly by the Stanford University Press.

P. A. WARNECK is a former naval officer of the Imperial Russian Navy and a graduate of the Ecole Navale, Brest, France; he has specialized in writing and lecturing on naval subjects, especially Russian polar expeditions.

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# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt  
*Editor*

William Henry Chamberlin

Warren B. Walsh

Michael Karpovich

Alexis Wiren

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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# Russian Attitudes Toward Asia\*

BY E. SARKISYANZ

**T**SARIST Russia never developed an elaborate ideology with respect to its Oriental policies comparable in popularity to that of Britain's "white man's burden." The expansion of Petersburg Russia in Asia was not rationalized through ideological slogans. "The mission to spread Western civilization," although used at times as a slogan, never became a part of the national consciousness. Moreover, Russia's relation to Asia never became an ideological issue among the different schools of Russian political thought, as did Russia's relationship to Europe.

Throughout the entire Petersburg period, Russian intellectual life was, as is well known, formally oriented toward the West. In spite of the rather obvious geographic relationship to China, Russian thought saw China almost exclusively from a Western European point of view. Even currents of thought that sought to reject Western values, like Slavophilism, actually only broadened European categories to a point where Russia would fit into them as a part of Europe. For Slavophilism too, Russia remained a part of the Christian European world and, though it was contrasted as "East" with the "Latin West," it did remain, nevertheless, Occidental in relation to China and Asia in general. Hegel's famous words that "the depravity of the Chinese is proved by their worshipping Buddha who is the void," a statement containing in one phrase three stupidities, was accepted without reservations.

Since the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894), the state ideology of the Petersburg monarchy had been opposed to the liberal and constitutional principles coming from the West. However, it too remained, just as did Slavophilism, from which it had partly evolved, still consciously Occidental in relation to Asia. An integral part of official Petersburg patriotism (immortalized already by Pushkin) was the notion of Russia's mission to defend Europe against the onslaught of Far Eastern hordes. This idea goes back to the beginnings of the Petersburg system when such a claim was to constitute, so to say, Russia's admission ticket into the European state system.

Similarly, the attitude of radical Russian Occidentalism (from

\*A paper presented at the Second Conference on Asian Affairs, University of Kansas, November 27-28, 1953 [Ed.].

which Bolshevism outwardly descends) toward Asia was on the whole negative.<sup>1</sup> It corresponded to that of European enlightenment, but without the cult of China associated with the French enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and was in the spirit of Hegel's above-quoted absurd statement on China. The Decembrist Nikita Muraviev had already explained the despotism of the Russian autocracy by the Eastern Asiatic influences, transmitted into Russia by the Mongol domination.<sup>2</sup> China remained a synonym for obstinate backwardness, and Asia in general a synonym for despotism for all the Western-oriented revolutionary thinkers from Belinsky,<sup>3</sup> Pisarev,<sup>4</sup> Dragomanov,<sup>5</sup> Mikhailovsky,<sup>6</sup> and Kropotkin,<sup>7</sup> to the Marxist Plekhanov. The latter defined the nature of Moscovite Russia as "a China in Europe" and coined the formula that "the more independent Russia's evolution is from that of the West the more similar it becomes to the development of the Asiatic empires."<sup>8</sup>

However, because of the Western associations of the Petersburg system, certain Russian revolutionary currents (though originally emanating from the West) were turned in a semi-Slavophile direction, a turn which potentially and dialectically pointed to Asia. Therefore, it is on the extreme Left, almost exactly a century ago, that the first hopes appear for a renovation of Russia, rising out of her association with the Far East. Thus, in 1850, the squire Sazonov, one of the very first Russian Marxists, referred, in a letter to Marx, to parts of the Far East as an area among whose peoples Marxism was claimed to have adherents, though the word "Communism" had never yet been pronounced.<sup>9</sup> A similar reference made by Bakunin in 1847 in a private letter to Emma Herwig might also be mentioned.<sup>10</sup> His friend, Alexander Herzen, judged China and Asia

<sup>1</sup>A. D. Gradovsky, "Slavianofilskaya teoriya gosudarstvennosti," *Teoriya gosudarstva u slavianofilov. Sbornik statei*, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup>*Vosstanie Dekabristov. Materyaly*, Leningrad, 1925, Vol. I, p. 322.

<sup>3</sup>V. Belinsky, *Sobranie sochinenii*, St. Petersburg, 1911, Vol. I, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup>D. I. Pisarev, *Sochineniya*, St. Petersburg, 1894, Vol. IV, p. 583 ("Shkola i zhizn").

<sup>5</sup>M. Dragomanov, *Turki, vnutrennie i vneshnie*, Geneva, 1878, pp. 9-11 and 28-29.

<sup>6</sup>N. K. Mikhailovsky, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, St. Petersburg, 1897-1909, Vol. VI, col. 818.

<sup>7</sup>P. Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, Boston, 1899, p. 177.

<sup>8</sup>G. V. Plekhanov, *Sochineniya*, Moscow, 1925, Vol. XX, p. 120.

<sup>9</sup>D. Ryazanov, *Ocherki po istorii marksizma v Rossii*, Moscow, 1923, p. 378 (Sazonov's letter to Marx of May 2, 1850).

<sup>10</sup>M. A. Bakunin, *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, Moscow, 1935, Vol. III, p. 268.

rather negatively,<sup>11</sup> following Hegel's evaluations which were shared by Russian Westerners. But after his disappointment in the revolutionary Europe of 1848, and his resultant ideological approach to Russia's Slavophiles, Herzen did point out that the focus of the world revolution would lie not in Europe but in the East, whose peoples, wrote Herzen, had received from Western civilization nothing but unhappiness, and who therefore would rise against the entire Teutonic-Latin world.<sup>12</sup> Eventually Herzen came to bless the Far Eastern and Mongol ethnic elements of Russia, even stating that the Mongol yoke had protected Russia against Roman Catholicism and had saved the village commune from destruction.<sup>13</sup>

Sergei Yuzhakov, a later representative of radical populism (whose foundations were laid by Herzen), wrote in 1885 that the then seemingly impending collision of Russia and Britain in a struggle for Asia would be a struggle of peasant Russia against shopkeepers' England.<sup>14</sup> Russia's expansion in the Orient was described by Yuzhakov as a struggle against nomadic Asia, against the so-called "Asia of Ahriman." This was to benefit and favor agricultural Asia, including China, in its defense against the nomads.<sup>15</sup>

Just like the semi-positivist radical populist Yuzhakov, the mystical and monarchist philosopher of religion, N. F. Fedorov, conceived Russia's relationship to the Far East in terms of an historic dualism between the agricultural soil and the steppe; for Fedorov, a whole philosophy of history was based on this dualism, in which Russia's expansion in the Far East through peasant colonization, was sharply contrasted with the commercial and industrial exploitation of the Orient by imperialist Europe.<sup>16</sup> In his admiration for Confucianism (which is connected with the rôle of the dead ancestors in Fedorov's philosophy of religion) he wrote, during the Western campaign against the Boxer uprising in China, that these events of 1900 were "a struggle between the worship of ancestors and the worship of gold." Fedorov claimed that, in the preceding South African War, England fought for gold mines,

<sup>11</sup>Alexander Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Moscow, 1919, Vol. V, p. 216; *Sochineniia*, St. Petersburg, 1905, Vol. V, p. 325.

<sup>12</sup>Herzen, *Sochineniia*, 1905, Vol. V, p. 173.

<sup>13</sup>Herzen, *Kolokol*, April, 1860, p. 557.

<sup>14</sup>S. E. Yuzhakov, *Anglo-russkaya rasprya*, St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. N. Fedorov's essays "Kitai i Evropa," and "Po povodu khristianskikh pamyatnikov v Kitae," *Russkii Vestnik*, 1901, No. 1.

while China now struggled in defense of the tombs of her ancestors.<sup>17</sup> Russia could, he wrote, either consider herself as European and cooperate in the strangling of China, the oldest empire in the world, or else she could renounce the title of being European, "an infamous title covered with shame" (*sic*), and put an end to the plundering of China.

In the thinking of Dostoevsky, who is known to have been influenced by Fedorov, Russia's mission in the Orient had a somewhat different basis. He wrote:

They [the Europeans] will never believe that we are capable of participating with them in further destinies of their civilization. They have seen in us enemies and upstarts. . . .

In Europe we are but parasites and slaves, but to Asia we shall come as masters. In Europe we are only Tatars, but in Asia we shall appear as Europeans.

Russia is not only Europe but also Asia. Perhaps even more of our hopes lie in Asia than in Europe. Yes, and perhaps even more than this. In our future destiny Asia will perhaps be our principal solution.<sup>18</sup>

Dostoevsky's concepts referred less to China than to the Islamic Orient. In spite of his emphasis on Asiatic affinities of Russia, the Orient was for him only an object of Russian political interests. His advocated expansion into Asia was only a means in the big power rivalry and was not organically connected with the Messianism of his "Russian Idea."<sup>19</sup>

A stronger emphasis on the Asiatic heritage of Russia and a more basic appreciation of Far Eastern cultures appears in the writings of Konstantine Leontiev. The ultra-conservative Byzantine philosopher, known among the radical intelligentsia as "the philosopher of reaction," is considered the ideological ancestor of the "Eurasian" school of thought, which developed among White Russian exiles in the 1920's. Leontiev wrote: "Russia has a particular political destiny . . . Her interests have a certain *ethical character*; they are linked up with the support of the weak and the oppressed ones. Therefore, these weak and oppressed are, at least up to a certain time, on the side of Russia."<sup>20</sup>

Leontiev rejected the middle-class civilizations of the West. For

<sup>17</sup>Fedorov's letter to Kozhevnikov of June 23, 1900.

<sup>18</sup>F. M. Dostoevsky, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, St. Petersburg, 1891, Vol. XI, p. 515.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, XI, p. 149ff.

<sup>20</sup>K. Leontiev, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Moscow, 1912, Vol. V, p. 29.

reasons similar to those of the revolutionary Herzen, he came to emphasize the Asiatic possibilities of Russia. The culture of China was appreciated by Leontiev much more than that of the Balkan Slavs, Belgium, or North America. Yet Confucianism was abhorred by Leontiev, apparently because of its humanistic and rationalistic features, as a "religious atheism." His abhorrence of Buddhism was even more explicit. He warned against both. Like the Apocalyptic Gog and Magog they would rise against Europe and the Slavs, when these latter too had succumbed to the general middle-class orientation of the West, betraying their Byzantine Christianity.<sup>21</sup> Out of such Apocalyptic visions, which inspired him to foretell the character of the Bolshevik Revolution a generation before its beginnings, Leontiev coined the slogan of a "Pan-Mongol menace" associated with China.

The latter notion played a great rôle in the philosophy of Vladimir Soloviov, who conceived history as a gigantic struggle between the East and the West, with Russia associated with the West. Though Soloviov contrasted the Russian Empire of the double eagle carrying in itself the reconciliation of Occident and Orient, and containing both of them, with Britain "poisoning the Chinese,"<sup>22</sup> his attitude toward China and the Far East was on the whole negative. Yet he believed that it could be conquered by the Christian world only through the spiritual attraction of its ecumenical ideal, if the Occident would only remain loyal to this ideal.<sup>23</sup> But if the Christian world, including Russia, should turn away from it, then the Far East would become a danger to the West. This found artistic expression in Soloviov's famous poem "Ex Oriente Lux." He maintained that, if the West should betray its mission of being the bearer of Christian truth, it would be bound to succumb to the yellow Asiatics, just as Byzantium had succumbed to Islam because it had not sought to transfigure its political life in the spirit of Christianity.<sup>24</sup> Soloviov's late writings, nevertheless, show a growing hostility to China. Such a hostility is not logical from the standpoint of Soloviov's own philosophy as a whole, which maintained that Asia would only fulfill the destiny of a Europe that had failed in its spiritual mission. Accordingly, Soloviov repented his poem "The

<sup>21</sup>N. Berdyaev, *Konstantin Leontiev*, Paris, 1926, p. 218.

<sup>22</sup>Vladimir Soloviov, "Peace of the East and the West," 1896, and *Natsionalnyi vopros v Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1891, Part I, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>V. Soloviov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, St. Petersburg, 1886-1897, Vol. VI, p. 137.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 38-43.



Dragon" which, in 1900, he dedicated to Kaiser Wilhelm, the antagonist of the "Yellow Menace," and in which he welcomed the Allied campaign against the Boxer movement in China as a crusade.<sup>25</sup> Shortly before his death, Soloviov became convinced that both Russia and the rest of Christendom had failed in their mission. The failure of the West and the rising of yellow Asia were associated in Soloviov's view with the end of history. In his famous eschatological "Three Dialogues" Soloviov looked forward to the last war of mankind, which was to take place in the twentieth century: the struggle of Europe against Pan-Mongolism led by China. Soloviov predicted that the success of a social revolution in France would facilitate the conquest of Europe by the Asiatics of the Far East. The conquest of Europe by the Mongols was to be followed by the eschatological unification of the churches and the end of history. Earlier, in his poem "Pan-Mongolism," he had already associated the historical failure and collapse of the Russian Empire, as the Third Rome, with the rise of China and Pan-Mongolism, which he welcomed as chiliaristic fulfillment and the end of history.

Such attitudes toward China and the Far East were expressed by Soloviov in the context of his religious and eschatological philosophy of history. Yet they are reflected also in the early Soviet attitudes toward the East. The collapse of Tsardom, champion of the Moscovite Third Rome, was associated by Communism with world revolution, which was to conclude the class struggle and thereby history itself. This world revolution was conceived as a rising of the Mongol world of Eastern Asia against the unrighteous West.

The philosophical dependence of the Symbolist poets, Belyi and particularly Blok, upon Soloviov's eschatological ideas is well known. After the war with Japan, Belyi wrote: "The Russians have degenerated, but so have the Occidentals, too. Only the Mongols are still normal. Russia is a Mongoloid country. We all have Mongoloid blood . . ." <sup>26</sup> and ". . . Out of the ruins shall not rise Port Arthur. But there shall rise China . . . Harken! Does not a tramping resound in the distance? These are the iron horsemen of Genghiz Khan!" <sup>27</sup>

And Blok, at the time of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations, addressed the following challenge to the West in a celebrated poem,

<sup>25</sup>V. Soloviov, "Drakon," *Stikhotvoreniya*, Moscow, 1915, pp. 211-212.

<sup>26</sup>A. Belyi, *Die silberne Taube*, Frankfurt, 1912, pp. 319ff.

<sup>27</sup>A. Belyi, *Petersburg*, Munich, 1919, p. 423.



"Scythians": "You are millions; we are multitude, multitude, and multitude. Come, fight! Yes . . . we are Asiatics, with greedy slanting eyes." Elsewhere he wrote, also in 1918:

If you, Germany, England, and France, should destroy the Russian Revolution, that would mean that you are Aryans [*sic*] no more . . . while you had a face, we looked upon you with the eyes of Aryans [*sic*], but upon your snout we shall look with our slanted eyes. We shall turn Asiatics, and the East shall overwhelm you, and your skin shall go to produce Chinese tambourines. . . .<sup>28</sup>

Thus, while in the thought of Soloviev, the Far East played the passive, negative rôle of an Apocalyptic threat, in Blok's formulations, East Asia becomes the executor of chiliastic fulfillment. Such sentiments of Russia's hostility to Europe and its affinity to the East, as expressed by Blok, are very far from Soloviev's Christian universalism and resemble more the attitudes of Leo Tolstoy.

In the philosophy of Tolstoy, which has been called more Buddhist than Christian, there already appears a definite connection between Russia's Messianism and positive evaluations of China's place and mission in the world. Thus Tolstoy wrote: "It seems to me that the rôle of the Oriental peoples, of China, Persia, Turkey, India, Russia [*sic*] . . . consists in showing to the world the true path towards Freedom. . . ." <sup>29</sup> Count Tolstoy formulated his condemnation of Europe's domination over the Orient in words that could have been taken from a Soviet "Manifesto to the East."

In the case of Tolstoy the primary denominational obstacle to a favorable evaluation of China in relation to the West is absent. On the other hand, mystical (as opposed to formally denominational) ideological attitudes led also to a positive evaluation of the Far East and China in the case of Prince Ukhtomsky.

Prince Esper Ukhtomsky was close to Nicholas II, whom he had accompanied on his Far Eastern journey in 1892. Although originally his ideology had been formed in the arch-conservative but Westernizing circles around Katkov, he ultimately went so far in his rejection of Europe that he maintained the theses of the Asiatic character of the Russians (implicitly expressed also by Tolstoy in the above-quoted statement). Such a claim had been previously made only by the enemies of Russia, with a purely contemptuous connotation of Russia's "Asiatic" character, for example, by the

<sup>28</sup>A. Blok, *Dnevnik, 1917-1921*, Leningrad, 1928, entries of January 11, 1918.

<sup>29</sup>P. Birukov, *Tolstoi und der Orient*, Zurich, 1925, p. 143.

Pole, F. H. Duchinski,<sup>30</sup> and had been sharply rejected even by the most extreme anti-Occidentalists. And already in 1904, Ukhtomsky wrote that "Pan-Mongolism" could represent no danger to Russia, since all traditions of imperial universalism (including those of the Asiatic empires of the Far East) had passed to Russia, which had inherited them in the struggle against the Mongols.<sup>31</sup> In a pamphlet entitled "About the Events in China: on Russia's Relationships with the Orient," Ukhtomsky had written in 1900 that the dissolution of the traditions of China by British imperialism are richer in consequences than the abuses of Russian administration in Asia. In 1904, Ukhtomsky maintained that the "political harvest" in Asia had been a long time ready for Russia and that Russia only needed to reach out for it. The entire Orient was to become an organic component part of the Russian Empire, which could have in Asia no other limits than "the blue sea surrounding the continent."<sup>32</sup>

This claim to the possession of the whole of Asia, Ukhtomsky based on his concept of the Asiatic affinities of Russia, particularly those of the Moscovite Empire to China and India. During the Boxer rising of 1900, Ukhtomsky advocated the then seemingly fantastic project of an alliance between Russia and China. He wrote:

In this community of Russia and Asia is contained the future solution of the Oriental question . . . And there will come a day, when the Orient shall arise from its slumber, awakened and irritated by the stormy elements of the oppressing white race. Like our mythical Ilya Muromets, the Orient shall then feel a mighty power in itself and shall demand to say its word. . . .

And Europe shall tremble. But neither threats nor violence nor accidental victories shall be able to accomplish anything . . . In the eternal conflict between Europe and Asia, Russia shall decide in favor of Asia. Another judgment is not possible where the judge is the brother of the complainant. . . .<sup>33</sup>

Such a consciousness of the Asiatic affinities of the Russian people has also been expressed by Esenin; Kluev, and Oreshin, peasant poets who more than other writers expressed the frame of mind of Russia's agrarian masses during the Revolution.

The consequent integration of the Far East into the scheme of the class struggle is on the whole an original Russian widening of Marxist

<sup>30</sup>F. H. Duchinski, *Nécessité des réformes dans l'exposition de l'histoire des peuples Aryas Européens et Tourans*, Paris, 1864, pp. 31-79.

<sup>31</sup>Prince E. E. Ukhtomsky, *Pered groznym budushchim*, St. Petersburg, 1904, p. 6ff.

<sup>32</sup>Ukhtomsky, *K sobytiyam v Kitae. Ob otnosheniakh Rossii k Vostoku*, pp. 24 and 84-85.

<sup>33</sup>Ukhtomsky, *K sobytiyam v Kitae* . . . , pp. 44-45 and 48 and 79.

thought. Marxism, which originally had been anti-national but definitely Western, in Russia developed national and anti-Western features. The main general features of the Soviet Russian policy in the Orient were first proclaimed in the famous "Manifesto to the Peoples of the East" on November 21, 1917, only two weeks after Lenin had seized power.<sup>34</sup> The circumstances surrounding the events of November 1917 indicate that "The Manifesto to the Peoples of the East" was less likely to have been produced by the immediate expediency of the hour than by previous long-range premeditation. Its basic idea, to call upon the semi-colonial Asiatic peoples to fight at the side of Russia against "Imperialism," is closer to the above-mentioned pre-Marxist Russian notions than it is to Western Marxism, though Lenin clothed it in Marxist garb. Lenin's scheme of an Asiatic policy might have been inspired by pre-Marxian Russian thinkers, of whom Herzen seems to be the most likely. In his case, as in the case of other Russian thinkers both radical and conservative, the turn towards Asia was conditioned by a turning away from Europe more than by positive attractions to Asia as such.

Russia's turning away from the West is connected historically with the development of Russian Messianism. Formulated around 1512, the Moscovite creed of the Third Rome, became the basis of Moscovite state ideology. Though finally abandoned by the founder of the Petersburg system, this originally Moscovite Messianism was preserved (and given a chiliastic emphasis) by the Old Believers (schismatics)<sup>35</sup> and to a lesser extent by the non-Westernized masses, which remained semi-Moscovite throughout the Petersburg period. Then the Bolshevik Revolution, by destroying the Westernized upper strata of society, was obliged to use for Lenin's so-called "Americanization" of Russia precisely those social layers least touched by Westernization and most Moscovite in outlook. This brought the Moscovite Messianism, buried during the Petersburg period, again to the surface.

Under the impact of German Romanticism, Slavophilism had introduced into the Petersburg system itself elements of a Russian Messianic consciousness that strangely resemble the folk-Messianism preserved since Moscovite times by the un-Westernized strata and particularly the schismatics and certain chiliastic sects. Though

<sup>34</sup>Reprinted, for example, in E. Hurwicz, *Die Orientpolitik der Dritten Internationale*, Berlin, 1922.

<sup>35</sup>N. Subbotin (editor), *Materialy dlia istorii Raskola*, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1885, pp. 86-87 and A. Kartashev, *Smysl staroobriadchestva, Sbornik statei posviashchennykh P. B. Struve*, Prague, 1925, p. 378.

some of the Slavophile notions of Russian Messianism were used by the autocracy of the last two reigns, others combined with Western currents into the ideology of revolutionary populism. This trend was absorbed by Bolshevism, but the process left an imprint upon it. This imprint came by way of the brief alliance with the Left S.R.'s, the transitory adoption of the populist agrarian program, and the Messianic notions of the early Soviet thought.<sup>36</sup> Finally, the very identification of Russia as "the first proletarian state in the world" provides a link between Russian Messianism and Marxist Messianism.

Yet it was for the first time in the Leninist period that Russia's Far Eastern policy came to be directly connected with concepts of Russian Messianism. It must be pointed out, however, that Russia's Far Eastern policy of the Petersburg period was no more determined by ideological considerations than that of any other contemporary power. Expressions of Russia's consciousness of mission in Asia in that period, were of minor significance, although occasionally the St. Petersburg foreign policy had some Messianic overtones. Of primary significance was power politics, *Realpolitik*, which in the Petersburg period did not radically differ from that of other powers. Only with the fall of the Empire was this relationship reversed. In early Soviet Russia, foreign policy became, in contrast to Imperial Russia, a function of ideology. The foreign policy of Soviet Russia can by no means be considered simply a continuation of that of Imperial Russia. According to Berdyaev, Bolshevism is only a distortion of the Russian national *idea*. Although a Messianic consciousness may be abused for purposes of imperialism, it is by no means the same as imperialism. Even the Moscovite idea of the Third Rome was in terms of power politics no more imperialistic than the medieval ideal of the Reich, though the present echoes of both ideas have been distorted for imperialistic purposes of power politics. Therefore, it is just as one-sided and misleading to *blame* Russian traditions of Messianism for Soviet policies of aggression in the Far East as it is to *deny* the existence of Messianic traditions in Russian thought and their survival in distorted form in Soviet ideology.

<sup>36</sup>For example: Ivanov-Razumnik, *Rossiya i Inoniya*, Berlin, 1920; *ibid.*, "Dve Rossii," *Skify*, 2, 1918, pp. 203-224; *ibid.*, *God Revolutsii. stat'i 1917 go goda*, Petersburg, 1918, pp. 156, 158-159.

# The Siege of Leningrad\*

BY CONSTANTINE KRYPTON

MY foreign friends who had had an opportunity to pass through Leningrad and see the city during the first three or four years after the war asked: "Where is all the horrible destruction from the bombardments and artillery fire which went on during most of the war? We have heard and read so much about it. Nevertheless the city remains intact." Such questions were asked by people who, before seeing Leningrad, had been to Germany, with whose shattered cities it would indeed be difficult for Leningrad to "compete." As a matter of fact, if we speak of the city as a mass of stone, during the whole time of the most intensive bombardment, September through November, 1941, the Germans succeeded in wiping out, on an average, only one or two houses per street. Only a few individual sectors of the city were razed to their foundations. The strength of the Germans did not suffice to do more damage than that, although it is true that occasional raids continued during 1942 and 1943. The population did not let the Germans burn the city. The shelling of the city grew steadier throughout all the years of the siege. It inflicted great damage, of course, but it was unable to destroy utterly the "mass of stone" that was the city. However, if the enemy did not succeed in the destruction of the stone buildings, it did achieve an appalling annihilation of the life within them. To this end, the aerial bombardments and artillery fire contributed their share, making the common conditions of the people's life more unbearable. Directly attributable to these forces, by official count, there were in all only 32,000 victims (killed and wounded). The basic cause of destruction among the population was starvation.

According to the official census of 1939, the population of Leningrad numbered 3,191,304. In July and August, 1941, after the start of the war, 200,000 to 300,000 were evacuated and a corresponding number were mobilized into the army. According to private information received from civilian departments and arrived at on the basis of ration cards issued at the end of September, 1941, there were in Leningrad in the neighborhood of 3,000,000 inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> In the

\*This is a translation in abridged form of two chapters from the author's book *Osada Leningrada*, N. Y., Chekhov Publishing House, 1952 [Ed.].

<sup>1</sup>This may be explained in two ways: (1) an increase in the actual number of inhabitants in 1941 over the 1939 figure, and (2) the influx of refugees from the suburbs.



summer of 1942, a doctor, who was familiar with conditions in Leningrad and a thoroughly dependable source, said that in the month of July about 700,000 ration cards had been given out in the city. His information was confirmed by a statement which the Russian censorship after the war allowed to pass in a diary devoted to the siege of Leningrad by the writer, Vera Inber. In her entry for August 7, 1942, we read: "The silence and desolation of the city are astounding. In Leningrad now there are less than a million inhabitants." At the most, the concentration of forces and the increase in the number of evacuees in the summer months across Lake Ladoga could be estimated in all as not more than 300,000 persons. Thus about 2,000,000 people had already died in the first year of the siege.<sup>2</sup>

The process of annihilation of the population began at the end of the month of November in 1941. Its outward sign in the life of the city was the appearance on the streets of every possible kind of sled, principally children's sleds with corpses on them. As a rule two sleds were tied together in order to provide sufficient length. Later they often carried the dead on single sleds, particularly if they were longer. They wrapped the corpses themselves in sheets, in blankets, in floor coverings, in bags of every sort, and all kinds of rags. Day after day the number of these sleds increased, creating at one period, the last of December and the beginning of January, an endless procession along the main streets.

The death process of the Leningrad population received in medical parlance the name of "dystrophy." Dystrophy had three stages. Dystrophy of the first stage was characterized by a general weakening of the system and a great loss of weight. Dystrophy of the second stage brought still greater weakness and loss of weight together with a series of illnesses bearing in particular the following symptoms: scabious gums, the quivers ("ants") in the upper parts of the abdomen, ulcers, swelling, numbness, stomach trouble, and the like. These symptoms were already present in part in the first stage. In the second stage people began, as the saying went in those days, "to devour their muscles." Dystrophy of the third stage, lasting two weeks on an average, was characterized by a complete break-

<sup>2</sup>Exact figures on the increasing death rate of the Leningrad population, if they are preserved in the files of the Soviet government, have of course been kept secret. One source of reasonably accurate information in those days were civilian employees of departments which dealt with the issuing of ration cards and registration (actual count) of citizens who had died.



down of the person, then death. It was said that those who passed into the third stage of dystrophy could not be saved. I happened to observe two cases in which relatives of a bedridden dystrophic person obtained butter and other nourishing foods, but it was absolutely impossible to give any real relief. In intellectual circles the third stage of dystrophy was called the "critical period." People who had entered the critical period in the great majority of cases remained indifferent to all around them, in a state of complete apathy. But not all were like that. Some approached death in a state of great excitement; they recalled their past life, sang old songs, demanded attentions from those around them, wanted to live. For many the critical period did not last even the usual "two weeks in bed," but killed them at once. People fell down and died unexpectedly while walking on the street, standing in line, while at work or at home.

Once, upon arriving at the Institute, where in the chill, unheated rooms classes of three or four persons were still going on, I was literally attacked by a rather short man. To me, as a dean of faculty, he very emphatically expressed his indignation that so few students were coming to the classes. It seems that this man was a teacher of mechanical drawing, whom I had not yet met. In the coming semester he was to give a course. As to the number of students, he was to have seven. Then I said, "The fact that you have seven students, instead of the usual four or five, shows notable progress, which can only be explained by great interest in your subject." This pacified him somewhat, but moving toward the group of students, he shouted with all his might, "Yes, but I want to have 25 students. I want to strive for one hundred per cent." Thirty or thirty-five minutes later a young woman student came running to me to report that the teacher of mechanical drawing was dead.

An exceptional death rate was established in the ranks of those who were completing their studies. Here competition took its toll. These people, despite all the obstacles, wanted to complete their graduate work and complete it well. Without food, in chilly dormitories, they stubbornly labored and wrote their papers. They didn't live long after that—some ten to fifteen days. Too much serious intellectual effort on an empty stomach had sapped whatever reserve strength they had. Fat people who were well filled out but not flabby seemed more able to endure hunger. In the process of dying strange things came to light now and then. A whole group of healthy people might quickly die, while a group of sick people

living under no better conditions might continue to live. Two men who were definitely tubercular amazed me especially; they outlived their non-tubercular relatives, although they lived under precisely the same conditions as the others. They were still living in June, 1942; what happened to them after that, I do not know.

In the opinion of physicians, at the beginning of December, 1941, a great percentage of the Leningrad population was in the second stage of dystrophy. The month of December was the transition period into the second stage for the great mass of the population. Living conditions contributed heavily to this. The food distribution for December became utterly insignificant. Workers received 200 grams of bread a day; civilian employees and dependents even less.<sup>3</sup> The ration of cereal made it possible to prepare soup only three or four times a week. Potatoes had been distributed for the last time in September. The number of workers' cards (first category) providing more bread and cereal was strictly limited. One holding a professorship of the higher schools of an institute received these cards only in January, 1942; but docents, graduate students, and others had the cards of civilian employees (second category).

Private supplies belonging to the population, which played such a large rôle in the succeeding months, were exhausted toward the middle, or at the latest, toward the end of November. During this month, the people were eating cats in the city. Standing in line for ration cards for December, I involuntarily overheard the conversation of some students. They had found that the meat of cats was very palatable; it was something like rabbit and only one thing about it was unpleasant—killing the cat. Cats defend themselves desperately. But soon I heard no more such conversations—there were no more cats to be killed. In December, people began to eat rats, mice, and pigeons. To an elderly woman who was dying, her young niece brought half a rat which she had succeeded in catching, and gave it to her. Nevertheless, the dying woman and her niece, together with their relatives, died soon thereafter. Next came dogs. But these were few in number, too. The people hunted for any kind of powder, from mustard on, in order to prepare something edible; they ate glue and even boiled white leather. Poisoning resulted, and, in a number of cases, ended in death. Suitable resources, rats and mustard powder, were not able to do the trick alone. One's own

<sup>3</sup>It is necessary to remember that in the Soviet Union the standard consumption of bread as the basic food is much higher than in other countries. A man who does physical work eats in a day as much as a kilogram of bread, and perhaps even more.

muscles were the basic source of life. Doctors recommended in private that people walk less and expend this resource more reasonably, since they would be unable to rebuild it.

Under special conditions, the workers in the NKVD, the war staff personnel, the leading party staff, most of the strong and responsible workers were supplied with food provisions. These people, of course, did not know hunger. Members of the Party had some privileges. However, outside of extra cups of soup without ration cards, and one or two additional cards, these privileges did not go beyond the legal allotment. Those who had any connection with provisioning, such as a dining establishment in some institution, fared somewhat better. The nourishment of a few very necessary members of the technical engineering staff was better. They were obliged to live in government establishments where they were fed in special dining rooms and received some food to take along with them. However, when one of the engineers brought his mother there to share his food with her, he received a reproof from the director. The better food was intended to guarantee his maximum working strength. His mother had to go straight home in order to share the common lot of the population.

At the end of November and the beginning of December, the German air raids came to an end. This, it seemed, might facilitate the carrying out of the physicians' advice about the economic expenditure of physical strength. The population would be able to sleep peacefully at night; it would not be necessary to run to the bomb shelters or put out fires. The population had begun to act so even earlier, when the raids were still going on. However, in place of the bombardments which had exhausted their physical strength, life took on something new and more arduous. First of all, the street cars had stopped running entirely in the city. While along the sidewalk there moved a succession of sleds with corpses, on the sidewalks, and sometimes in the streets, there were a great number of people walking, since they lacked any other means of transportation. In December and January this movement provided the city with great animation, and in any case, with an increased tempo of life. Wherever one went, one had to go on foot, to work, for various errands, simply to the homes of people nearby. Everyone had to make a colossal effort and expend an extraordinary amount of energy.

A great misfortune was the beginning of the cold, and later the

terrible freezing weather, reaching  $-40^{\circ}$  Réaumur.<sup>4</sup> Not only was it necessary to stand in the lines, but one had to jump up and down all the time to keep one's feeble body warm. Most people lacked fuel completely. As soon as the cold weather set in, the water pipes began to freeze. For a long time people tried to thaw them. All efforts to save the water system were of no avail, and the entire population of the city began to go to nearby pumps which were still in operation. For a long time, a hole pierced in the street by an artillery shell, at an eight- or ten-minute walk from our home, saved me. There was always water there which the people in the apartments close by came to get. Many persons, not having a pump in the neighborhood, nor any holes in the street, had to walk long distances, sometimes as far as the river to get water. The toilet problem was solved by pouring everything out in the snow in the back yards. The cold itself was a great physical hardship.

The outward appearance of the city corresponded with the general living conditions under which the people of Leningrad perished. Having devoted all its strength and attention to the construction of big industrial enterprises, the Soviet government had neglected the communal, city economy. In the first month of the siege, the appearance of the houses of Leningrad was tragic. Because of the constant artillery fire, a great majority of the windows had been shattered. There was no glass. Board and plywood were also difficult to obtain. The gaping windows were often plugged up with pillows, or other objects. More fundamental repairs were, of course, out of the question.

More desolate even were the appearance and condition of the interior of the houses of Leningrad and of the municipal apartments, common to all the cities of the country. The poverty and neglect of these dwellings were utterly depressing. Zoshchenko thus described the interior of an apartment which a man who had just returned from the army had finally succeeded in obtaining. "The room is pretty. It has two windows. A floor, of course, and a ceiling. That is all there is. Make no complaint. In this place Golovkin lovingly established himself. He bought wall paper and put it on himself. He put up coat nails to make it look more cozy. And he lives like a king."

When the freezing cold began, the inhabitants of the besieged city were forced to crowd into single rooms and lived piled on top

<sup>4</sup>Réaumur  $-40^{\circ}$  is equal to  $-58^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit and  $-50^{\circ}$  Centigrade.

of one another in utter squalor. It was impossible to heat these rooms. One had to sleep in one's clothing, putting on every available garment in order to keep warm. Because of the cold and the lack of water, many people ceased washing altogether. Hopelessly frozen kitchens and spare rooms were turned into storage places. Here, frequently, toilets were built. An extremely difficult circumstance was the complete lack of electric light. Small smoky lamps of the period of the civil war shed barely enough light to enable one to move about the room.

Such were the conditions under which the Leningrad people lived, sickened, and died.

In the middle of December, General Meretskov took the city of Tikhvin. Hopes arose of freeing the Northern Railway, and of the arrival of supplies from Vologda. It was rumored that "commercial" food stores, where it would be possible to purchase bread and cereal at high prices, would be opened. Beyond this the people of Leningrad did not dare to dream.

Soon after the capture of Tikhvin, Zhdanov returned to the city with a report to the Party organization of Leningrad. I happened to learn the contents of this report thanks to a chance meeting with a former student who had been rapidly promoted during the months of the war. The report was enthusiastic. Speaking of the capture of Tikhvin, Zhdanov wrote: "It is only the beginning of the breakthrough of the German encirclement, in a very short time there will follow more and more successes for us. The siege of the city will be raised." The reaction of my acquaintance to these promises was highly restrained.

In Leningrad, meanwhile, at the end of December and in January, the situation took on a catastrophic character. The number of those dying each day jumped to between 25,000 and 30,000. Possibly for the part of the population that was dying, this was the natural transition into the critical period with its inevitable consequences. The administrative powers, literally overwhelmed by the increasing death rate, gave orders to open the morgues. These sprang up in the yards of Leningrad houses. One yard of large dimensions was chosen for every seven to ten houses, depending on the number of residents. A sign was hung out and through the house-manager a suitable notification was made. Everyone could now take his dead to the morgue.

For removing the corpses from the streets, trucks were allotted, but they were often in unsatisfactory condition. It was hard on the



truck-loaders. Frequently, in the midst of their tasks, they dropped dead and replacements had to be sought. For the work in the morgues a university brigade of the air defense organization, whose "special" work was no longer needed, was enlisted. In this group there were highly qualified academic workers. An average of ten or twelve trucks loaded with corpses passed along our street each day. On the principal streets their number was far larger. The number of sledges carrying the dead decreased but they did not disappear entirely. Some of the people still preferred to use their last strength to take their relatives to the cemetery, though there was no chance of a funeral there.

Though the general run of people, regardless of their suffering, remained remarkably self-controlled, occasionally one heard about some particularly aggressive behavior. In the middle of December, an acquaintance of mine, an old woman, whose daughter was in a concentration camp, came onto the street, holding her beloved dog on a leash. The dog had been with her for a very long time. Before the old woman knew it, several men rushed at her. Some wanted to grab the dog; others tried to snatch the leash from her hand. They all vied with one another, shouting, "It's my dog." At this point some other pedestrians came up just in time to stop the attackers and drive them away. The old woman returned thankfully to her home with the dog, but even so, in three or four weeks, she ate the animal herself.

People were advised to walk cautiously on the dark stairways in the early morning. Cases occurred when on the assumption that a person was going for bread, someone would hit him on the head and would take away his ration cards. Usually it was necessary to be cautious on these dark stairs once the bread was procured. Bread had to be carried wrapped and hidden. Sometimes in the lines on the premises of the store, boys ventured to snatch the bread from the owners. They watched for a suitable moment and then dug their teeth into a piece of bread in someone's hands, trying to bite some off. One such scene I happened to observe myself. The owner of the bread into which the little boy had sunk his teeth grabbed him with great violence by the throat and wouldn't let him swallow; then, bursting into tears, she said that she had a little boy like him who was dying at home.

All these things were individual excesses, resulting in a certain increase in lawlessness. It is possible even to speak of new kinds of "crime." One of these was called "hiding corpses." By keeping the



dead person at home for a week or so and concealing the death, some people collected enough bread on the dead man's card to pay for the digging of the grave. Others did it to collect bread and other ration cards of the deceased for their own personal use. The saving of a shriveled corpse in the freezing apartments in those days was not a difficult matter. I knew of one civilian employee who succeeded in hiding her dead aunt for almost an entire month. She regretted afterwards that she had not done the same with her mother, who had died two or three days before her aunt. Still later she herself died, and a neighbor was able to hide her, too, for five days. Practically speaking, it was difficult to use the cards of a dead person for more than twelve or fourteen days. Moreover, only a small per cent of the population engaged in this practice.

During the second half of January, it was said that the death rate fell to 9,000 or 10,000 per day. This may have been due to the fact that the weaker people had already died or possibly to a change in the quality of the rationed bread. At any rate, the improved conditions were short-lived. A new misfortune descended. The heavy frosts and the general run-down condition of the city's buildings led to a breakdown of work in the city bakeries and the greater part of the stores remained without bread. In some stores where bread was received, tremendous lines formed and stood from early morning until late evening. Masses of people, after waiting ten or twelve hours in the freezing temperature, left empty-handed. In about a week only a very small amount of rationed bread came on sale. The lack of bread, together with the extreme exhaustion caused by waiting in the cold, shot the death rate up at once to the former figure of 25,000 to 30,000. Some people died in line; many died on the streets, after running desperately from store to store to inquire whether there was any hope of a bread delivery.

At the beginning of 1942, there occurred some events that were very embarrassing to the military and civilian powers of the city. Crowds of people who had been standing in line robbed several bread stores. More far-reaching than the pillaging of a few food stores, considering the particular conditions of Soviet life, was an occurrence of political significance. Two organizations of women (Technical Engineering Workers) joined together and presented a petition in which they requested, for the sake of the dying children, the surrender of the city. They pointed to the general practice of international relations, and especially to the recent announcement that Paris would be declared an "open city." Whether this petition

succeeded in reaching any representatives higher than Popkov, the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, I have never learned. In the city the petition did not make much of an impression, though many people knew about it. Some women Party workers actually discussed the matter with me, though I was not a Party member, and, what is more surprising, they did not condemn the women who had drawn up the petition.

In February, some improvement in the distribution of food began. The bread norms reached 500 grams for workers (first category), for civilian employees (second category) 400 grams, for dependents (third category) 300 grams. It was possible to procure it only for "today and tomorrow." All exceptions to this rule were strictly prohibited. At the beginning of March, I called on some students of the Institute to notify them of possible evacuation. In two places I found large rooms in each of which the five or six occupants lay around the room dying.

A certain stabilization of life in Leningrad accompanied the stabilization of rations and the death rate. In offices everyone began to talk more persistently about the necessity of doing more work, in spite of everything. The Party secretary of the Institute became insistent on everyone doing his duty. City doctors who had perhaps received a little additional nourishment began to go to the apartments to examine the sick. There was talk about starting public projects for tidying up the city, clearing the street car tracks, and so forth. The military powers began to check and recheck their count of surviving men. To persons subject to call, evacuation from the city was positively forbidden, as it had been since the beginning of the siege.

By the end of December, after the establishment of a more dependable route across Lake Ladoga, a small number of people were evacuated in open five-ton trucks. The trip across the lake usually proceeded satisfactorily, but there were some mishaps. Occasionally, the trucks would come under the fire of the German artillery which pierced holes in the ice, and they would sink in the water. At other times they met with individual snipers who fired upon them. The worst trial was frostbite. The exhausted bodies of the evacuees had no resistance, and for many this suffering ended in death.

In February the evacuation took on a different character. From Leningrad people were sent by railroad to Lake Ladoga and then were transported across the ice in trucks. The Finland Station from which the departure took place became a veritable ant-hill against

the background of the somber, paralyzed city. Besides those departing, many other people scurried there. Petty thievery of bread given to the evacuees and even robbery were common occurrences. The general measures for evacuation remained, however, very insignificant. Only the most needed were taken out.

At the beginning of February, 1942, a few Leningrad professors found access to one of the generals of the staff of the Leningrad front. They were not representing anyone and came without any petition. Their object was to clarify the prospects for the city's future. The General was completely obliging, even courteous. The picture he presented to them can be summarized in the following four statements:

1. Our principal task is to wipe out the Fascist usurpers, as Comrade Stalin has said.
2. We do not conceal the fact that Leningrad is the front.
3. The civilian population continues to present an obstacle to military powers.
4. Those who are healthiest will live through it all.

Among the professors present there were people who had begun their lives with other ideas of service to the people. The last two statements disturbed them. The General hastened to add: "We must understand how to sacrifice in order to sacrifice." As to the way in which the authorities had already understood how to sacrifice some three million people, not a word was uttered.

# Foreign Authors and Soviet Readers

BY MAURICE FRIEDBERG

"**B**OURGEOIS" writers of the capitalist West have always been a serious concern to Soviet literary critics. The principles, however vague, of the current interpretation of Socialist Realism cannot be applied successfully in appraising the merits of non-Soviet authors. On the other hand, critical realism, the standard by which the pre-revolutionary Russian writers are judged, can be comfortably used only in dealing with the old foreign classics. Foreign writers, like the pre-revolutionary Russian, were crudely divided into "progressives" and "humanitarians" on the one hand, and "reactionaries" and "obscurantists" on the other. The classification, as is always the case in Soviet criticism, was based on considerations of a political nature, with esthetic factors playing a secondary rôle.

But this is the official criticism that we get from the pages of *Literaturnaya gazeta*, *Novyi mir*, *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, and the pronouncements signed by Ilya Ehrenburg, M. Mendelson, or Alexander Fadeev are all Party-inspired. What about the tastes of the rank-and-file Soviet citizenry? Do they like foreign literature, who are their favorite authors and what is their opinion of them? Do Soviet readers' views on this subject coincide with those expressed in the Soviet press?

Unfortunately, as in the case of all the other problems pertaining to life behind the Iron Curtain, it is impossible to give any definitive answers. We cannot check the records of Soviet libraries or conduct any extensive polls among the Soviet readers of foreign belles-lettres. However, as a result of World War II, many Soviet citizens were displaced from their old homes and a part of them decided to remain in the West. An expedition of Harvard University's Russian Research Center interviewed these people and this article is based on the answers given by 329 respondents to the question as to what books were read by them in the U.S.S.R. in 1940, i.e. in the last pre-war year, and what was their opinion of these books.<sup>1</sup> Thus we

<sup>1</sup>This study was made possible by a grant from the Russian Institute of Columbia University. Financial and technical assistance was also obtained from the Russian Research Center of Harvard University operating under a contract with the U.S. Air Force, AF (33)-038-12909. Reproduction permitted for any purpose of the U.S. Government.

obtained some data on a problem that was hitherto confined to sheer speculation.

The interest in foreign authors was amazingly great, and some of the respondents complained that they were difficult to procure in the libraries. In the case of certain contemporary writers who fell into disfavor with the Soviets (such as Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, Jerome K. Jerome, Conan Doyle) this was, in 1940, altogether impossible, since their works were simply removed from the shelves.<sup>2</sup> In addition, some respondents asserted that in general excessive reading of foreign literature was not looked upon with favor by the authorities. A teacher of foreign languages in a college recalls that "the Soviets inculcated into the students the fact that Western literature was nonsense, that it wasn't worth reading"; a sports instructor and Young Communist League organizer insists that to avoid trouble, one "must not be interested in foreign literature, whether in the original language or in Russian translations," and a collective farmer reported that in his school librarians asked people who showed their preference for foreign authors whether Soviet literature does not interest them.

Most of the respondents exhibited pride in their acquaintance with foreign literature and some of them resented the alleged national narrow-mindedness on the part of the Germans who "know only Goethe and Schiller," while they, the Russians, read and appreciate Western European and American writers.

Our sample, which consisted of people of all ages, professions, and educational levels (although the number of young and educated respondents was higher than in a "representative" sample of the Soviet population) seemed to confirm the latter part of these assertions. Forty-nine respondents read French authors and forty-six mentioned American writers. British literature was third in popularity with twenty-seven respondents. Eighteen persons reported reading German authors, and four read translations of Polish literature; Scandinavian, Italian, and Spanish works had three readers each; two persons read a Chinese novel, while one respondent read an ancient Greek epic, another read Arabic fairy-tales and the third, a modern Czech novel.

Foreign works of fiction were regarded by the respondents first and foremost as a trustworthy source of information on life abroad.

<sup>2</sup>Exact references to the dossiers of the Russian Research Center are in the possession of this writer. The material quoted preserves the original wording of the respondents' testimonies.

Thus an official in a ministry declared that the most reliable picture of conditions in the West was to be found in foreign fiction, "such as Hemingway." A school teacher, Young Communist League member, wanted to learn what the life in the United States really was like, and he turned to Jack London and Upton Sinclair. "I liked foreign literature because I sought the fresh air from another, new life," explains an economist. This is also the essence of a longer comment offered by a stage-manager:

My understanding of the Western European world consisted only of reading works, translated into Russian, of the very greatest contemporary European writers. And there was still another source of my information on the West. These were personal discussions with those writers who had travelled to the West and returned to Moscow. The last source of my information on the West was the critical reviews of the philosophy and literature of the contemporary West in the Soviet magazines and books. These often cited quotes from esthetic and philosophical streams that were hostile to Communism, and these seditious citations seemed to me to be windows or breaths of air through which spring wind blows.

The same respondent also offers another reason for his reading of foreign translations:

Foreign books and films made a very favorable impression on me by the simple fact that they were completely apolitical. In them I found no forced array or Party ideas, etc. They were not always brilliant on the spiritual level. I often discovered that in them there is the desire to take people off the street, but I did not see one single trace of evidence that these works were mutilated in their creation by the terror of the régime. . . . This freedom of theme and interpretation seemed to me beautiful.

Although no other respondents gave such well-defined explanations for their preference for foreign works of fiction, the comments made in explaining the reasons for dissatisfaction with *Soviet* literature indirectly clarify the preference for imported reading matter. In other words, the constant complaints about the regimentation of the Soviet writers explain why the respondents preferred to read works written by the free artists abroad.

Since foreign fiction was regarded in most cases as documentary evidence on life outside the Soviet Union, the changes or additions made in it by Soviet editors were regarded with resentment by those respondents who commented on this topic.

An economics instructor read Theodore Dreiser's *The American Tragedy*—and then saw it performed in a theater, where the end of the play did not coincide with the end of the novel. The respondent



offered no details; in the novel, we shall recall, the young man Clyde Griffith wants to drown his mistress, a poor girl who is pregnant by him, so as to be able to marry a rich woman. Griffith is apprehended by the authorities and is electrocuted. Although Dreiser implies that Clyde Griffith's crime was a result of the American economic relations, he nevertheless has the villain punished. It would be most interesting to see the Soviet stage adaptation of the novel; was the criminal vindicated by a capitalist court?

A more coherent instance of Soviet censorship's mutilating foreign literature was conveyed by a laboratory technician. This time it was in the form of "editorial changes" made in the film, *Les Misérables*, based on the novel by Victor Hugo. In the book, the convict Jean Valjean becomes a respectable citizen, and the turning point in his life was the moment when an old clergyman testified that the candlesticks, which Valjean stole from him, were his gift to Valjean, thus saving the hero from police persecution. But in the Soviet version

... they cut out the main cause for Jean Valjean's becoming a good man, namely the priest's behavior, his giving him candlesticks, etc. Thus the films were spoiled and falsified; for those who did not know the story, the impression was completely wrong.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>It is significant, however, that this incident was retained in the Soviet edition of Hugo's novel, which enabled the respondent to make the comparison.

In the Soviet film, *Treasure Island*, based on the popular novel of adventure by Robert Louis Stevenson, the boy hero Jim Hawkins became a girl named Jenny Hawkins; this made it possible for the adult hero, Dr. Livsey, to fall in love with the youthful hero, and both are then shown on the background of the Irish Rebellion, which was not mentioned in Stevenson's story (*The New York Times*, January 17, 1938, p. 1). For this information the author is indebted to Mr. John D. Rimberg of Columbia University's Russian Institute.

Recent articles in the Communist press of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia indicate that while Corneille, Racine, Sophocles and Euripides are condemned as "too conservative" or simply "reactionary," Shakespeare is being performed—with some modifications; thus *Romeo and Juliet* is deprived of its happy end, and a post-scriptum is added at the end of the performance explaining that the conflict in the play was between the ruthless exploiting classes and the medieval forces of "love and peace" ("Command Performance," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. III, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 25-36).

Textual changes are also made in consecutive editions of Soviet works of fiction; see this writer's "New Editions of Soviet Belles-Lettres: A Study in Politics and Palimpsests," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (February, 1954), pp. 72-88; also "Soviet Literature and Retroactive Truth," *Problems of Communism* (published by the U.S. Information Agency), Vol. 3, No. 1 (January-February, 1954), pp. 31-39.

Much more subtle is the accusation voiced by an engineer, Communist Party member, who claimed that

... classics were not true, for they are edited with commentaries and prefaces, proving that Tolstoy, Shakespeare, and Molière were revolutionaries and fore-runners of the Bolsheviks; Hugo, for example, was presented as "a thinker" of the French Revolution.

On the whole, however, the respondents had no doubts as to the veracity of the foreign authors and when questioned about this fact they would frequently give a surprised reply—"Why, of course."

The most popular genre was literature of adventure, and it should be pointed out that the readers of this type of fiction were by no means limited to younger or less educated respondents. Literature of adventure offered a convenient escape from the drab Soviet reality and many people took advantage of it, for this could not be supplied by either Soviet literature or the Soviet cinema, which reminded them of the persistent and annoying propaganda to which they were exposed at the numerous meetings, and which was fed to them daily by the radio and the press. It is this desire to escape reality which explains the fact that the most popular foreign author (and one of the most widely read authors in general, ranking not far behind Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy) was Jack London. His works, always full of thrills, sensations, and exoticism, were read by old and young, laborers and intellectuals, those who read much and those who read nothing besides London; *Martin Eden* and *Iron Heel* were most frequently mentioned. Altogether, twenty-one respondents read London in 1940.

Another favorite was Alexandre Dumas-père; twelve respondents read Dumas and praised his works, particularly *The Count of Monte Cristo*. Jules Verne's fantastic novels of adventure describing scientific expeditions (*20,000 Leagues Under the Sea* and *80 Days Around the World*) were read by nine persons, all of them young and all but one with little education. The same is true of the four respondents who read the adventure novel *Treasure Island* by Robert Louis Stevenson (one of them, a high school student, described it as the best novel he has ever read), and the four people who read the classic of adventure novels, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. One person read a book by James Fenimore Cooper, and three persons enjoyed reading the historical romances of Sir Walter Scott; *Ivanhoe* was the only specific title mentioned.

Thirteen persons mentioned reading works by Victor Hugo; the

titles included *Les Misérables*, the novel written under the influence of the Socialist doctrines of Cabet and Proudhon, and *Quatre-vingt treize*, which deals with the insurrection of the people of La Vendée and Brittany against the First Republic. Hugo's audience was more sophisticated, and some of them called Hugo their favorite author.

As one would expect, the old classics of foreign literature were read exclusively by educated people. In 1940, eleven of them read Shakespeare, six read Goethe, five, Schiller; Molière and Cervantes' *Don Quixote* were read by three respondents each. E. T. A. Hoffmann, Heinrich Heine, and Dante were read by two persons each, while G. E. Lessing, Homer, and *1001 Nights* were read by one person each.

Nineteenth-century foreign authors (with the exception of adventure novelists) were usually read by an older and more educated audience. The list is headed by Guy de Maupassant<sup>4</sup> (nine readers), then comes Honoré de Balzac (eight readers; specific title—*Père Goriot*), who is followed by Émile Zola (particularly his "social" novel *Germinal*), with seven respondents. No comments were made in regard to these authors, but one of the six respondents who read Mark Twain declared that *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* was the best novel he had ever read. Five persons read works of Charles Dickens,<sup>5</sup> and four read O. Henry's short stories, expressing their great admiration for this author. The Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz was mentioned thrice, and two references each were made to Marie Henri Stendhal (*The Eighteenth Brumaire*), Gustave Flaubert (*Madame Bovary* and *Letters of Flaubert*), and George Sand's *Consuelo*, the melancholy and tender novel, bearing an imprint of both Chopin's music and Fourier's socialism.

The great majority of the contemporary foreign authors cited by the respondents are well-known left-wingers or former left-wingers. This, of course, does not reflect the readers' tastes, for the factor that determined their reading of contemporary foreign fiction was its availability, and, by and large, these were the only contemporary authors translated and published in the Soviet Union. People who

<sup>4</sup>Maupassant's short stories, full of suspense, and devoting much attention to the problem of sex and the carefree life of the bohemians could also, to an extent, be considered "escape" literature.

<sup>5</sup>One of the respondents hastened to add that he read Dickens before 1940, for in 1940, during the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon, Dickens' books "were taken away from the library because he was English"; doubtful as this statement might seem, it should not be wholly dismissed, for such action could have been taken by some over-zealous, politically-conscious local official.

read this type of literature were mostly young and better educated.

Fifteen persons read, in 1940, books by Theodore Dreiser; the titles mentioned were *The American Tragedy*, *The Titan*, *The Genius*, and *Sister Carrie*. All of these books, in the opinion of Soviet critics, expose the jungle laws and decadence of capitalist America, and at present Dreiser is one of the few foreign authors praised by the Soviet press. Dreiser was also praised by one of our respondents.

Upton Sinclair, the author of *The Jungle*, an indignant outcry of protest against the social injustices suffered by American workmen, was read by ten persons; two of them praised Sinclair.<sup>6</sup>

The seven persons who read Ernest Hemingway referred only to two titles, *Farewell to Arms*, the novel dealing with World War I, full of pacifism and pessimism, and *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, which is considered to be strongly pro-Communist. One of the respondents said that he "read but did not like" Hemingway. A more detailed appraisal of Hemingway by another respondent will be considered later in this article.

Five persons referred to John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, the novel showing the misery of migratory workers in America, while four respondents mentioned reading Sinclair Lewis (*Main Street*). Four people quoted the name of Lion Feuchtwanger, referring in particular to *The Oppermanns* and *Power*.<sup>7</sup>

The following were read by two respondents each: Romain Rolland, Thomas Mann, Archibald J. Cronin, Stefan Zweig (in particular his horror-packed melodramatic novel *Amok*), Henrik Ibsen (the "social" play *Doll's House* and others) and John B. Priestley (unidentified plays).<sup>8</sup> John R. Dos Passos, once a very popular author in the U.S.S.R.<sup>9</sup> was mentioned three times (*The Forty-Second Parallel* was the only title).

The remaining authors were read by one person each: Pearl Buck (probably one of her "Chinese novels"), Eugene G. O'Neill, Damon Runyan, Erskine Caldwell, Gerhart Hauptmann, G. B. Shaw,

<sup>6</sup>Again, one of the respondents stressed that he read Sinclair before 1940 when Sinclair became "forbidden."

<sup>7</sup>Before the Soviet-German pact of 1939 the Soviets have given much publicity to anti-Nazi German writers, such as Thomas Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger and Stefan Zweig.

<sup>8</sup>Priestley, who was once held in high esteem by the Soviets, is now referred to in the Soviet press as "former writer Priestley."

<sup>9</sup>Vsevolod Vishnevsky, the Soviet playwright, recalls that in 1933 a survey indicated that Dos Passos was the most widely read author among the Soviet writers (Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature 1917-1950*, 1951, p. 256).

Jerome K. Jerome, Jean Giono, Gilbert K. Chesterton, and Jaroslav Hayek (*The Good Soldier Schweik*).

As we have seen, the most popular of foreign translations are novels of adventure, preferably with an exotic setting. The most widely read authors included Jack London, Alexandre Dumas-père, and Jules Verne. The less educated respondents read almost exclusively this type of foreign literature, but it also attracted the younger members of the intellectual professions and students (e.g. a twenty-six year old college student: "I like best Indian and Wild West stories"; or another student, twenty-three: "I was mainly interested in detective stories and fantastic novels like Jules Verne"). It would seem that this escapist literature is in particular demand among people with menial or routine jobs, and also among those who are most exposed to constant propaganda—students and teachers.

The readers of psychological and social-didactic novels are in general older and better educated than those addicted to adventure stories. It is curious that none of these respondents voiced any complaints over the fact that the Soviet publishing authorities make available *only certain types of works*, a thing one would expect them to realize after having spent a few years in the West, although a few of them stressed the fact that not all the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky were reissued in the U.S.S.R. They did not realize, therefore, that the picture of the West presented to them by the translations that were available was somewhat one-sided. Almost all of the respondents believed in what they read in foreign translations; there was actually only one person, a forty-year old teacher-newspaperman, who admitted disbelieving a work by a foreign author. Ironically enough, he doubted the veracity of the two Soviet films with scenarios written by foreign authors, Wolff's *Professor Mamlock* and Feuchtwanger's *The Family Oppenheimer*, both of which showed the inhuman persecution of the Jews by the Nazis.

One gets the impression that at least the younger Soviet-educated interviewees understood foreign belles-lettres in the way desired by the Party. This may perhaps be seen from the declarations of many of the respondents who, parallel to violently anti-Communist declarations, stated their preference for the left-wing foreign authors, obviously ignorant of their political sympathies. Here is a conclusion reached by a twenty-nine year old sports instructor:

I had read books like those of Jack London, whom I certainly did not believe to be a Communist. He described how a tramp is treated by the judge [probably



in *Martin Eden*—MF]. I thought it is certainly much better in the Soviet Union.

The following is another lesson learned from reading contemporary foreign literature. The respondent is a twenty-eight year old student and Young Communist League member:

In foreign literature the hero is always isolated and that's how we reacted to it: we concluded that in foreign countries a man must live in isolation from his society. This is an abnormal situation. . . . In Soviet literature the hero is always closely linked to his people.

A very interesting comment on Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* was made by another student, twenty-six, Ten-Year school graduate. It centers around the portrayal of Robert Jordan, the young American fighting with the loyalist guerrillas in the Spanish Civil War. Jordan is not a Communist, yet he admires the Communist leadership of the Republican army and fights for a cause dominated by the Communists. It is this—Jordan's confusion in political matters—that the respondent is discussing:

As a novel, it was good. But the ideology was weak. You couldn't say whether Robert was an idealist or an adventurer. . . . Hemingway cannot justify Robert's action. He cannot tell why Robert was fighting. Hemingway draws beautiful pictures but he cannot set down his point with clarity. In the Soviet Union authors have to be clear in the presentation of their taste, the lines of development in the character. This presentation of Hemingway's lost generation we had previously, in Lermontov's *The Hero of Our Time* and in [Byron's] *Childe Harold*. Such a presentation brings forth in us, young people from the Soviet Union, a smile of condescension. It is a picture of the West. In the West, they are lost. They don't know to whom to turn. They cannot formulate with clarity their ideas.

We can assume, therefore, that the effect of foreign literature on these former Soviet citizens was, on the whole, the one that was hoped for by the Communist authorities. The older works of Western European and American writers create an image of poverty and social injustice. The later foreign belles-lettres, carefully selected by Soviet editors, are, in most cases, an outright condemnation of the capitalist world. The hero in such novels is usually confused and does not know what to do to improve this state of affairs. The answer to this question was supplied to the reader in a foreword or in a commentary: Communism is the only way out. Although this solution was not acceptable to our respondents, a fact easily seen from their refusal to return to Soviet Russia, much of the negative image of the West persisted.

The uncritical acceptance of foreign authors as truthfully representing conditions abroad, which was so characteristic of our respondents, is of great significance. The aim pursued by the Soviet authorities in the dissemination of foreign works of fiction is the same in 1954 as it was in 1940, and those readers who once believed Jack London or Anatole France are at present likely to trust the veracity and objectivity of Howard Fast or Louis Aragon.

The only type of foreign literature that seemed to disappoint the expectations of the Soviet editors was the novel of adventure which became a medium of escape from the Soviet reality. The Soviets seem to become increasingly aware of this fact, for some of the fiercest attacks in the postwar years were aimed at such authors as Conan Doyle and Robert Louis Stevenson. An attempt is also being made to create a Soviet literature of adventure, particularly science fiction, so as to be able to direct this demand for adventure novels to "reliable" Communist-spirited works of domestic production.

# Moscow's Views of American Imperialism

BY XENIA J. EUDIN

IN 1945, Soviet Russia, the ally of the United States and Great Britain in World War II, became their partner in the newly established United Nations. For a very brief period it appeared that cooperation between the non-Communist and Communist camps had become a reality, and that efforts to modify the attitude of Soviet leaders to non-Soviet ideology had proved successful. Soon, however, the non-Communist world was shocked and puzzled by Soviet behavior. Every attempt of the democratic powers to stabilize the world was bitterly assailed by Moscow. Such projects as the Marshall Plan and the proposed federation of Europe, were denounced by Soviet representatives in the United Nations and by the Soviet press. An outstanding example of this tendency was Moscow's reaction to the Marshall Plan. Speaking at Harvard in 1947, General Marshall had defined the Plan in the following words: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance must not be on a piecemeal basis. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative."

Whereupon, a well-known Soviet historian presented the Communist views on the above plan by stating: "Two camps have come to exist in the post-war world: one camp which is imperialist and anti-democratic, aiming at the establishment of world hegemony of the U.S.A., and the strangulation of democracy; the other camp which is anti-imperialist, democratic, aiming at true democracy, the uprooting of imperialism, and the liquidation of the remnants of fascism." The author then went on to hurl his accusations against the United States in particular: "The chief center of international reaction, and the chief pretender for world domination is at present the monopoly capitalism of the U.S.A. In exchange for the traditional American isolationism now come the doctrines of Truman

and Marshall, the program of world expansion. . . . The countries which have been 'exposed' to American help become the colonies of American capital. Their independence and sovereignty become a fiction."<sup>1</sup>

A. A. Zhdanov, member of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party, was equally emphatic in denouncing General Marshall's project. This, in Zhdanov's opinion, was an "American plan to enslave Europe." "The new and openly expansionist course which the U.S.A. has taken," Zhdanov said at the conference of Communist parties which met in Poland, September, 1947, "aims at establishing the world mastery of American imperialism. In order to consolidate the United States' monopolistic position in [world] markets brought about by the disappearance of America's competitors—Germany and Japan—and in order to weaken America's capitalistic partners—Britain and France—the new policy of the United States presupposes a broad program of military, economic, and political measures directed at the establishment of the political and economic mastery of the U.S.A. in all countries which are the object of American expansion, and the reduction of these countries to the level of American satellites. American policy, therefore, aims at the establishment in these countries of régimes opposed to any interference with the exploitation of them by American capital."<sup>2</sup>

Soviet leaders have denounced with equal vehemence what they have called the "cosmopolitan" plan for the federation of Europe, a plan to which Mr. Churchill had eloquently referred at a public meeting, May 14, 1947: "If the people of Europe resolve to come together and work together for mutual advantage, to exchange blessings instead of curses, they still have it in their power to sweep away the horrors and miseries which surround them, and to allow the streams of freedom, happiness, and abundance to begin again their healing flow. This is the supreme opportunity, and if it be cast away, no one can predict that it will ever return or what the resulting catastrophe will be."<sup>3</sup> However, Zhdanov's opinion of the plan was devastatingly critical: "One of the methods of the ideological 'campaign' which goes hand in hand with plans for enslaving Europe

<sup>1</sup>I. Lemin, "Tritsats let borby S.S.S.R. za mir i bezopasnost" (Thirty Years of Struggle by the U.S.S.R. for Peace and Security), *Mirovye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, No. 10, 1947, pp. 49-50.

<sup>2</sup>A. A. Zhdanov, *O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>3</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *Europe Unite, Speeches 1947 and 1948*, 1950, p. 79.

is the attack on the principle of national sovereignty, the invitation to people to surrender their sovereign rights for the sake of 'world government.' This campaign represents an attempt to mark the limitless expansion of an American imperialism which ruthlessly violates the peoples' sovereign rights, and to present the U.S.A. in the rôle of the defender of the right of the common man by picturing those who struggle against American aggression as supporters of an old-fashioned 'egotistical' nationalism."<sup>4</sup>

Malenkov, speaking on the thirty-second anniversary of the October Revolution, offered this further explanation of the project for a federated Europe: "In what respect do these hallucinating plans of the 'Americanization' of all countries and continents differ from the mad plan of Hitler and Goering regarding the 'Germanization' first of Europe, and then of the world? In what respect do these plans differ from the intention of Tanaka-Tojo regarding the subordination of all of Asia and the Pacific area to Japanese imperialism? Actually, they differ only in one respect, namely, that the aggressive program of the present warmongers surpasses all plans of their German and Japanese predecessors."<sup>5</sup>

In considering these Communist statements and scores of others we might ask: was this judgment of the efforts of non-Communist countries to stabilize the world a mere expedient growing out of the existing cold war, or were the policies adopted by Soviet leaders after World War II an expression of their deeply rooted political philosophy—a fact which the democracies may have sadly overlooked in recent years?

It would seem that the sources of Soviet political ideology can be traced to statements made by Lenin during World War I when he spoke against the principle of the United States of Europe and when he wrote his famous *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in which he developed the theory of the progressive decay of the capitalist system. "From the viewpoint of economic conditions of imperialism, i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world by the 'advanced' and 'civilized' colonial powers," Lenin wrote in 1915, "the United States of Europe under capitalism is either impossible or reactionary."<sup>6</sup> Lenin further added: the "United States of Europe is a cartel of imperialists."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Zhdanov, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>5</sup>*Pravda*, November 7, 1949.

<sup>6</sup>V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XXI (4th ed.), p. 309.

<sup>7</sup>V. I. Lenin, *Tetradi po imperializmu*, p. 683. For an able analysis of Lenin's



In 1920, confronted with the fact that the expected world revolution was not forthcoming immediately, and being desperately eager to make commercial and other contacts with the outside world, Soviet leaders found it necessary to adopt a policy of coexistence with capitalist states. However, their faith in the inevitability of capitalist decay persisted, and coexistence became for them merely a *peredyshka* (breathing space), perhaps of long duration. Since that time Soviet leaders and historians have never tired of using this term. Nor have they ceased to argue that, during such a breathing space, they could not rely upon any plans of the non-Communist world for ameliorating the world situation.

In 1924 there occurred an event of profound importance for Soviet Russia and for the Communist movement throughout the world: V. I. Lenin died on January 24, 1924. Lenin's death set off a desperate struggle for succession which lasted for a number of years. But within a short time after Lenin's death, Stalin began to pull ahead of his rivals. He proclaimed himself Lenin's faithful pupil and the executor of Lenin's ideas, and he initiated a cult of the infallibility of Leninism. Stalin himself, however, used some of Lenin's views and omitted others to advance his own theory of "socialism in one country." It was imperative, Stalin argued, that Soviet Russia prolong the breathing space in order to keep herself free from war and capitalist intervention. The maintenance of peace was essential for socialist construction in Russia; consequently, there must be peaceful coexistence between socialist Russia and capitalist countries. This did not mean, however, that Stalin had given up the idea of world revolution; he simply argued that new circumstances made it necessary to adopt different means to reach that goal. As he expressed it, "the revolution which had been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the prerequisite for the world revolution."<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, Europe which, according to Stalin, was the revolutionary goal of the Communist "army of Comrade Lenin," con-

attitude toward the principle of the United States of Europe, see C. Dale Fuller, "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organization for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914-1917," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June, 1949.

<sup>8</sup>I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, VI, p. 396.

tinued to stagger under the after effects of World War I. The total victory of the Entente over Germany and her allies, the destruction of the pre-revolutionary balance of power in Europe, the colossal losses suffered by both warring sides, the uprooted economy of all belligerent states, the war weariness and disillusionment of victors, and their determination to inflict a humiliating peace upon the vanquished—these were the major factors affecting European international relations in the early nineteen twenties. Under such circumstances, the new régime which had been established in Soviet Russia, ostensibly in the name of the workers and peasants, was bound to exert an attraction upon the impoverished and hard-pressed masses of Europe. Therefore, while preaching the necessity of temporary coexistence with Western capitalist countries, the Russian Communists tried steadily and persistently to spread their gospel of the coming millennium through a Soviet type of revolution and the establishment of a worldwide Communist régime. Germany, in particular, attracted the attention of the Moscow leaders. Lenin had already expressed his great faith in the revolutionary potential of the German masses, and he believed that, if united, Soviet Russia and revolutionary Germany would become invincible. In the early twenties, in spite of the fact that defeated Germany failed to adopt a Communist régime, the two ostracized countries were soon brought together by force of circumstances. To Germany, the idea of co-operation with Soviet Russia was popular in some quarters since it seemed a counterweight to the Versailles Treaty. Such cooperation laid the foundations for the Soviet-German agreement at Rapallo and for the Soviet-German secret military collaboration which ensued.

Since Lenin's hope for the destruction of the international system established after the Versailles Treaty did not materialize, the task confronting the Communists was to prevent any stabilization of Europe on the basis of that treaty. In the year when Lenin died, the Dawes plan was proposed by non-Communist political leaders for improving Germany's economic position. This plan called for scaling down German reparations to meet Germany's capacity to pay and for basing reparations payments on trade. It also proposed to float a large loan in order to set German finances in order. The Dawes Plan was accepted by the German government and adopted by the Allies at a conference in London during July and August, 1924.

Simultaneously with the adoption of the Dawes Plan, a movement

to unify Europe and make it independent, economically strong, and safe from Communism, was initiated by Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi of Austria. This movement received further impetus from the Pan-European Union, and in the summer of 1924, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi sought the support of leaders of the European states. In October, 1924, the new French Premier, Eduard Herriot, openly supported Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's proposals in a speech at the Sorbonne. The German Foreign Minister, Dr. Stresemann, likewise gave his support. "If Europe does not learn the lesson of history," wrote Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, "the fate suffered by the Romano-German Empire will fulfill itself in her own case. Both in a political and in a military sense she will become the chess-board of the world—a pawn in the hands of world politics, as she once was the arbiter. . . . The Russian and British World Powers will have their Asiatic differences fought out by German and French soldiers on the Rhine. As yesterday were China and Turkey, so tomorrow Europe will be divided into 'spheres of interest' by England, Russia, and America." Count Kalergi then noted that while the other parts of the world were growing stronger through cooperative effort, Europe was becoming poorer and weaker. In prophesying what was to come, Count Kalergi added: "All this will go on until finally from the Russian Revolution there will emerge a Russian Napoleon, who out of the petty states of eastern Europe will form a Rhenish League and thereby inflict the death-blow upon Europe."<sup>9</sup> Being fully aware of the Russian menace, Count Kalergi wrote: "The unanimous aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or union, should be the prevention of Russian invasion. . . . For if Russia knows that, were she to attack Poland or Rumania, she must inevitably encounter the armed forces of France and Italy, Germany and Spain, she will be more likely to think twice before venturing to attack."<sup>10</sup>

The Russian Communists strongly disapproved of both the Dawes Plan and the Pan-Europa movement. As far as the Dawes Plan was concerned, the Moscow leaders turned on the full pressure of their propaganda machine to discredit both the plan and its originators. *Izvestiya* termed it "a plan of the most cruel exploitation of the German worker . . . , an agreement among separate factions of world capital which are preparing a bankers' advance in a joint

<sup>9</sup>Richard B. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 1926, pp. 19-21.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

effort to make the German worker pay tribute to the world money exchange." "The plan really means," so *Izvestiya* stated, "peace among the capitalists and war against the working class."<sup>11</sup> Karl Radek wrote that the plan meant that the United States had decided to return to Europe so as to enrich itself "from the blood of the German people."

The Manifesto of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, adopted in July, 1924, called upon the Communists to "struggle against that conspiracy of the capitalist violators which goes by the harmless name of the Experts' Plan," and advocated instead the creation of a "Workers' and Peasants' United States of Europe" to be set up by a "fierce struggle in each country against the national bourgeoisie . . . and by the combined efforts of the world proletariat to seize power and establish its dictatorship."<sup>12</sup>

Finally, analyzing the international situation in September, 1924, Stalin remarked that the adoption of the Dawes Plan by the Allied powers meant that the hegemony of America replaced that of France, thus adding new contradictions to those which already existed in Europe, and failing at the same time to solve the old ones. "Future world events," Stalin continued, "will be determined by these hostilities, and not by the 'pacifist' speeches of such gallows-birds as Hughes or the loquacious Herriot."<sup>13</sup>

The Pan-European movement and the Dawes Plan were criticized at great length by two distinguished Soviet writers: Trotsky, who, in spite of his disagreement with Stalin, continued to support the Communist interpretation of the world situation, and Tanin, a Soviet historian and specialist in European affairs. "American imperialism," wrote Trotsky, "is mercilessly savage, rapacious, and brutal in the most literal sense. Yet, thanks to the special situation in which America finds itself, it is possible for American imperialism to cloak itself in a mantle of pacifism, and thus avoid the methods of the imperialist rascals of the old world." The imperialist advance of the United States, according to Trotsky, took place under the banner of "Freedom of the Seas," "the Open Door Policy," etc. Even the United States' efforts to stabilize Europe, to restore European markets, and make Europe capable of paying its debts received no credit from Trotsky. "American capital," he said, "is seeking world

<sup>11</sup>*Izvestiya*, No. 192, August 24, 1924.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, No. 153, July 9, 1924.

<sup>13</sup>Stalin, *Sochineniya*, VI, 291.

hegemony; it seeks to establish an American imperialist autocracy on our planet."<sup>14</sup>

The movement for the formation of the Pan-Europe Union fared no better in the estimation of Russian Communists. "It is true," wrote the Soviet historian Tanin in his *Amerika na mirovoi arene* (America in the World Arena), "that capitalist Europe is rent asunder by inner contradictions and is approaching a new war much more horrible than the one of 1914-1918 . . . the European people must unite, and a United States of Europe is needed . . . [but] . . . the United States of Europe can come into existence only as a result of a gradual maturing of the revolutionary conditions and their successful utilization by the revolutionary-minded proletariat first in one country, and then in another." Such endeavors, Tanin believed, could succeed only if the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat were directed by a steel-like revolutionary organization, as embodied in the Communist Party.

According to Tanin, "the German policy of the United States which has found its final expression in the Dawes Plan, represents a clear example of how American imperialism approaches its victim stealthily, slowly, and persistently in order to trap it in its web of economic and political enslavement."

Having thus interpreted American efforts to assist Germany and Europe through the Dawes Plan, Tanin then put the following question: "What will be the consequences of the advance of American imperialism on Europe, and of the attempts of the latter to check this advance in so far as the relations between the U.S.S.R. and these two camps are concerned?" His answer was: "America and the U.S.S.R. are facing each other as two deadly hostile worlds. America is a kind of concentrated 'healthy' world capitalism; the U.S.S.R. is concentrated 'destructive' world Bolshevism. America aims at world hegemony; it aims to reach this goal through the Dawesization of Europe in the West, and through pressure to be exerted upon China in the East. By this pincers movement the United States intends to squeeze the European and Asiatic continents and establish 'order' in them. But between Europe which is being Dawesized and China which is continually harassed, there stands on the line of this encircling movement, a giant, the U.S.S.R., acting as a kind of steel-like wedge. This wedge has tremendous potentialities of strength for a counter-action of its own, and in

<sup>14</sup>*Izvestiya*, No. 177, August 5, 1924.



addition, it can organize a counter-movement on the part of the hundreds of millions of Chinese and other semi-colonial peoples. . . . So long as this revolutionary giant lives, there will be no American hegemony."<sup>15</sup>

In summing up the position of the United States when it would confront the U.S.S.R. "on the path of history," Tanin asked: "*Kto kogo?*" ("Who will knock down whom?"). "History's answer," he said, "depends on the development of events in two directions: within the Soviet Union, and outside its borders—there being, of course, a close connection between the two." Tanin then referred to the rapid domestic development of the Soviet Union, and to the fact that America's growth could not continue indefinitely. The latter fact, Tanin believed, was very important in the evaluation of future perspectives. He did not think that America would fight the U.S.S.R., but it might incite Russia's neighbors to do so. Tanin then took another look in his crystal ball and concluded: "In evaluating events on a broad historical scale, we must take into account something we are often apt to forget when we view the present-day United States, namely, the fact that the faster American imperialism develops, revealing its tendency toward concentration of capital and chronic agricultural crises, the sooner will irrepressible domestic conflict mature within that country. This conflict stems from the very nature of imperialism, since it is a conflict between the country's productive and acquisitive forces. America will then reach more rapidly the limits set for it by history, and it will more quickly give way to its heir, the bearer of the idea of the world revolution, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."<sup>16</sup> Thus, Moscow's post World War II attitudes toward the U.S.A. closely parallel those of thirty years ago.

<sup>15</sup>Tanin, *Amerika na mirovoi arene*, pp. 207-208.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 213.

# The Volga-Don Navigation Canal

BY P. A. WARNECK

THE Volga, largest river of Europe, is navigable for about 2,050 miles; its tributaries, the Oka, irrigating central Russia, and the Kama, flowing from the Ural Mountains, are navigable for about 750 and 1,050 miles respectively. In 1936, the basin of the Volga accounted for 46% of all the river transportation of the country. Ever since the era of Peter the Great, canals connecting the Volga through the Neva with the Baltic Sea have been in operation. Through Lake Ladoga and the Baltic-White Sea Canal, built by political prisoners in 1934, the Volga is linked with the White Sea. Nineteen thirty-seven saw the completion of the Moscow-Volga Canal, which transformed Moscow into a port of the Volga. This was followed by the construction of the dams of Uglich and Shcherbakov, which opened the Volga to big motorships above Shcherbakov, formerly Rybinsk, all the way to Moscow. This water system encompassed a good half of European Russia; however, a link with the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Black Sea was still missing. And yet, the economy of the southern regions of Russia is complementary to that of the north.

The Volga flows into the closed Caspian Sea; the Mareen water system (the canals, Volga, Lake Onega, Leningrad) freezes up earlier and for a longer period than the Volga; on the broad river, moreover, navigation can be partly kept up with the help of ice-breakers. Since 1947, the Mareen system has been deepened and equipped with new locks allowing the passage of vessels with a carrying power up to 4,500 tons. Despite these improvements, the voyage from Leningrad to Shcherbakov, a distance of about 700 miles, has been reduced only to eleven days—about as long as it takes to navigate down the Volga and the new Volga-Don Canal to the Sea of Azov. These facts clearly demonstrate the need for a navigable waterway between the Volga and the Black Sea.

The idea of connecting the Volga with the River Don, flowing into the Sea of Azov, is one of long standing. About the year 1700, at a time when the Muscovite tsardom was engaged in wars to acquire an outlet to the Sea of Azov, Tsar Peter ordered the construction of a canal linking the upper Kamyshinka, a tributary of the Volga, with the River Ilovlya, flowing into the Don. This canal

was in use while those wars lasted, but was later abandoned because of lack of water at the watershed and the shallowness of the rivers.

Although the gap between the Volga and the Don in the Stalingrad area does not exceed 60 miles, the construction of a navigable channel linking them presented insuperable difficulties. The Volga is separated from the Don by a ridge 290 feet above water level at Stalingrad and 145 feet above the Don at Kalach, with a rather steep slope towards the Volga.<sup>1</sup> The watershed between the two rivers is an arid steppe with little rainfall. Before building a canal, one had to find a way to supply the watershed with the masses of water needed to feed the locks, an expenditure of water equal to the capacity of a lock during the passage of a vessel, that is, no less than 20,000 tons. The only solution would have been to pump water from the Don up a height of 165 feet. This method, however, before the advent of cheap electric power, was highly unprofitable in a commercial sense. This is the chief reason why the construction of a Volga-Don canal had been delayed for two centuries. Only the advance in hydraulic and mechanical engineering during the last decades has made it possible to undertake this gigantic task. A few years before the last war, detailed plans for the mammoth project were drawn in Moscow under the guidance of Chief Engineer S. Zhuk. Some preliminary work on the project was begun before the war. Interrupted by the war, the operations were resumed only in the second half of 1948, and by 1950 the earth-moving work was in full swing. It took altogether three years of intense effort to complete the canal.

On May 31, 1952, the waters of the Don descending from the watershed through the locks of the Chapurinkovsky flight, merged with the waters of the Volga at Lock No. 2. On June 2, the motor-ship "BT 306"<sup>2</sup> left Krasnoarmeisk on the Volga and reached Kalach on the Don on June 9, after having placed floating landing-stages all along the route. On June 27, the large passenger ship "J. Stalin," which had left Moscow nine days before, officially opened the canal. The passage through the canal took 15 hours, Tsimlansky Lake was crossed in 12 hours, and on the 30th of June, 11 days after the departure from Moscow, the ship reached Rostov. The passage through the locks between Tsimlansky port and the lower Don took 18 minutes.

<sup>1</sup>The Caspian Sea into which the Volga flows lies 328 feet below sea level.

<sup>2</sup>Tugboats of that type had been built at Stalingrad for the express purpose of servicing the Volga-Don Canal.

The distance between Stalingrad and the Sea of Azov is over 300 miles. It may be divided into three sections, the lower Don, where navigation since ancient times has been maintained by means of excavations to deepen the river-bed, the middle Don from Tsimlansky to Kalach, and the artificial canal from Kalach to Krasnoarmeisk on the Volga.

To provide cheap power and create a vast store of water, the middle Don, near the Tsimlansky Cossack settlement, has been blocked up by an earthen dam (over eight miles) with a maximum height of 115 feet. Close to the right bank rises a ferro-concrete dam, about 1,600 feet in length with spillways through which excess water flows off at the rate of 810,000 cubic feet a second. By the left bank passes the connecting canal to the lower Don, three miles long, with two locks. Here also begins an irrigation canal and a special channel for the passage of fish. A hydroelectric station with a power of 160,000 kilowatts<sup>3</sup> has been erected on the earthen dam, which is traversed by a paved highroad, as well as a new railroad connecting Morozovsky station with Kuberle on the Stalingrad line.

The obstruction of the waters of the Don, in particular its spring floods, has created the Tsimlansky Reservoir with a capacity of 840 billion cubic feet. This vast new lake has a width of up to 19 miles and extends 110 miles to Kalach. Then it narrows, but at high water still reaches the River Ilovlya 75 miles farther up.

The geography of the whole area has been completely changed. The Tsimlansky Cossack settlement and many other villages have been transferred from the left to the right bank of the river. A new Tsimlansky port has arisen where freight coming in by rail from the North Caucasus is trans-shipped. This shortens the railway run of freight by 155 miles, as compared with the Stalingrad route. Special yards for northern timber have been provided at the port; and from this base the timber will be transported to various places of consumption.

At the other end of Tsimlansky Lake the port of Kalach has sprung up. This is the terminal station for those craft emerging from the canal which are unfit to risk navigation across Tsimlansky Lake. Here the river tugboats towing the barges in are replaced by sea-going ones of the "Academic" type, specially built in Leningrad for service on this section of the route. At Kalach, part of the

<sup>3</sup>The new French hydroelectric station on the River Rhone has a power of 300,000 kilowatts.

cargoes are trans-shipped to coasting vessels, while the rest are directed to the Donetz coal fields either by rail or else up the River Don, which is navigable for 500 miles from its mouth.

Here at Kalach begins the new navigation canal, 63 miles long, linking the Don with the Volga. To feed the canal with water, three powerful stations pump hundred of millions of cubic feet of water daily into one of three reservoirs arranged stepwise. To create them, effective use has been made of the terrain. They form three navigable lakes separated by sections of the canal and by locks.

There are altogether 13 locks along the route. A few miles upstream from the lighthouses at the entrance to the Don, Lock No. 13 gives access to the Karpovsky Reservoir measuring 15 square miles. Two locks separate it from the Bereslavsky Reservoir. Then, behind Lock No. 10, Varvarovsky Reservoir, the largest of the three, stretches for 12½ miles. This is the watershed section; from here the pumped-up water descends through the locks in two directions. Next comes the so-called Chapurnikovsky flight formed by six almost adjoining locks. There are three more locks before the Volga is reached. The Volga entrance to the canal is opposite the Malo-Serpinsky Peninsula, slightly below Stalingrad, and is marked by a tall lighthouse.

The locks easily float the largest passenger ships of the Volga, and can hold vessels of even greater length and tonnage. The canal and the River Don are equipped for nocturnal navigation, and the locks are provided with electric lighting. The gates of the locks as well as other constructions are decorated with massive towers and statuary in the style fashionable at the end of the last century. Although the canal bears Lenin's name, a huge statue of Stalin rises at the Volga entrance.

Concurrently with the construction of the navigation canal, a vast scheme for the irrigation of the waterless steppes has been worked out and is now being put into effect. A beginning was made in 1952 with two irrigation canals supplying water to 250,000 acres of land in the Rostov region. As a next step, the project provides for canals reaching deep into the arid Salsky steppe, ultimately to be linked with the Manich. When this becomes a reality, an immense semi-wilderness will be transformed into green fields.

The completion of the gigantic Volga-Don project covering many hundreds of miles within a comparatively short time was due exclusively to the extensive use of the most modern machinery. Ninety-five per cent of all the earth-moving operations were mechanized,





which alone made possible the shifting of 5,380 million cubic feet of soil. Mechanization is the chief feature distinguishing this latest Soviet project from earlier undertakings carried out with spade and wheelbarrow as chief implements and the forced labor of political prisoners, dying by the thousands of cold, hunger, and overwork, as the sole motive power. Instead of the G.P.U. providing manpower, hundreds of machine-works all over the country took part in supplying the project with dredges, excavators, and other up-to-date machinery. The turbines of the hydroelectric station were built by the "Metal Works," and the electrical equipment was produced by the plant "Elektrosila" (Electric Power), both of Leningrad. Before the start of the construction, temporary concrete works of high productivity were set up along the future route of the canal; they were transferred later to the new dams under construction on the Volga.

A great many difficulties had to be overcome in the course of the construction, and a few setbacks were inevitable. Thus it happened that one million cubic feet of clay in a sudden landslide crashed into the basin of Lock No. 3, burying everything in its path and jeopardizing the completion of the canal according to plan.

The Volga-Don Canal has achieved the incorporation of five seas and water systems into a single complex. This has made possible the cheap large-scale transportation of Donetz coal, of cement and stone, of wheat from the Don and Kuban, from the south to the north of the country; of machinery and timber, from the north to the south; and, to some extent, of oil from the Caspian Sea to the Donetz coal fields. In the field of passenger transportation, a regular run of large motorships between Moscow and Rostov, serving the tourist traffic mainly, has been added to the local lines.

The canal has also strategical value inasmuch as it allows the swift transfer of small warships, submarines, and torpedo-boats from one sea to another. Ocean-going vessels, however, are still unable to navigate the Volga, since the Gulf of Taganrog, the lower Don, and the Volga itself are too shallow for them. Only at high water is the Volga considered navigable for vessels of 13 feet draft. The dams now under construction near Stalingrad and Kuibyshev are expected to improve this situation by creating a store of water for the dry season.

The shallow depth of the Sea of Azov was the reason for the construction, at the end of the last century, of a certain type of sea-going two-screw steamer of small draft—the "Elpidiphor." The

chief task of these craft was to carry grain to the deep-water port of Mariupol where it was trans-shipped to ocean steamers. It is probable that vessels of a similar type, but propelled today by motor engines, will make their appearance on the Volga, carrying cargoes to Black Sea ports; for this purpose, however, their number would have to be considerably increased.

The new canal is located in the south where winters are not so long as in other parts of the country. The Gulf of Taganrog and the lower Don are covered with ice from November to April. With the help of icebreakers, however, it is possible to keep the port of Rostov open for more than ten months of the year. But farther north the ice is firmer and holds longer. Near Stalingrad and in the Kalach area the Volga is icebound during, on the average, 110 days of the year, and the canal will be frozen somewhat longer than this. Therefore navigation on the Volga-Don Canal will have to be discontinued for about four months annually, which is one and one-half to two months less than on the canals leading to the Baltic Sea.

## Book Reviews

GURIAN, WALDEMAR. *Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics*. Notre Dame, Indiana, Notre Dame Press, 1953. 166 pp. \$3.75.

BOUSCAREN, ANTHONY T. *Imperial Communism*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1953. 256 pp. \$3.75.

COLTON, ETHAN T. AND OTHERS. *The Russia We Face Now*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1953. 79 pp. \$1.75.

The extensive descriptive, interpretative, and speculative literature on Soviet imperialism has been further increased by the appearance of these three volumes: a scholarly symposium, an encyclopedic treatise, and a popular review.

The first, edited by Professor Waldemar Gurian, is, with two exceptions, a collection of papers presented at a symposium at the University of Notre Dame in December, 1952. Four of the papers, by Timasheff, Pop, Pipes, and Ling, respectively, compare Tsarist and Soviet policies in regard to expansionism, the treatment of the Ukrainian and Moslem minorities, and relations with China. The other three comprise Wiktor Weintraub's incisive analysis of Soviet cultural imperialism in Poland, F. C. Barghoorn's review of recent trends in Soviet ideology, and an introduction by the editor.

The outstanding essay in this volume is, unquestionably, Weintraub's contribution. It is exemplified by an intimate acquaintance with the facts, a keen awareness of cultural processes, and great ob-

jectivity. The study clearly differentiates the primary areas of Soviet cultural penetration and the few remaining islands of independence, such as the Catholic press. Its conclusions are most significant: "... Official Tsarist Russia led a frontal attack against Polish culture and Polish national feelings. Soviet Russia, while not opposing them directly, tries to remold them, to transform them in such a way as to make of them a weapon of its own policy.

"It is, in its general design, a very clever policy. Fortunately, due to the shortcomings inherent in every totalitarian régime, it is put in practice exclusively by heavy-handed, standardized bureaucratic methods, often extremely clumsy. Different as they are, however, they are the methods of Russian imperialism." (pp. 110-111).

The remainder of the book is less rewarding. Gurian's and Barghoorn's competent papers are restatements of previously published data. The chapters by Timasheff, Pop, Pipes, and Ling are much weaker in scholarship; they ride their theses hard, with insufficient appreciation of the complexities and obscurities of the data. Pipes' paper may be examined as an illustration. In my understanding, its main conclusion is a sharp differentiation between the relative leniency of Tsarist policy toward the Moslems, a leniency which culminated in a wave of intellectual awakening at the end of the nineteenth century, and unlimited Soviet brutality, the nadir of which was the genocide perpetrated

on Moslem populations in World War II. So far as I know the facts, this contrast is greatly overstated. Von Kaufmann's conquest of Turkestan and the subsequent displacement of the native population from northern and eastern Kazakhstan were both brutal and conscious acts of imperialism, dominated by fear of the rising power of Kokand, on the one hand, and the goal of self-sufficiency in cotton, on the other. But what is more important is Pipes' failure to clarify the mechanics, and hence, many of the basic dynamics, of Russo-Moslem contact.

Let me state a few aspects of this problem. One is the unique rôle of the Volga Tatars. Throughout the nineteenth century they were the aggressive missionaries of Islam, catalysts in the formation of new military-theocratic states in the Caucasus (Shamil) and Central Asia (Kokand, Bukey Horde, etc.). Yet, at the same time, they served as advance agents—cultural, economic and political middlemen—of Russian penetration. Even today, the rôle of this people persists: Zh. Shayakhmetev, who served as Communist Party Secretary for Kazakhstan for about a decade, is a Volga Tatar.

Soviet-Moslem relations have also been greatly affected by the policy of socio-economic compartmentation. The urbanization and industrialization of Soviet Central Asia have been executed fundamentally through Russian and Ukrainian immigration. The native populations have remained, except for a mobile, Russified, intermediary element, engaged entirely in agriculture. Within this group the persistence of pre-Soviet patterns (as shown in the local press, the ethno-

graphical literature, novels, and refugee statements) is still great. There appears to be, in fact, a constant process of the assimilation of Soviet officialdom to such "corrupting" influences. Thus, to regard the process of culture change as completed, with Islam wiped out by the monolithic state, appears to me to be a premature implication.

Professor Bouscaren's work represents an enormous undertaking, an attempt to bring together the record of contemporary, international Communist activity. It consists of three short chapters on Soviet ideology and foreign policy, and a world-wide review, country by country. By and large, it is a useful book. Unfortunately, it is marred by highly colored statements, e.g. (in regard to Thailand) "... Pridi, a so-called 'liberal' with Marxist leanings (he was much in favor with American officials during World War II) chose to work with the Communists. . ." (pp. 59-60). Furthermore, it contains serious factual inaccuracies: "The United States, which had originally insisted upon the principle of no forcible repatriation . . . capitulated to British and Indian pressures and voted for the Indian proposal . . . General Van Fleet was allowed to resign his commission under circumstances which made it appear to be a re-enactment of the MacArthur dismissed (*sic*). ." (p. 96). Finally, no documentation is presented on a number of categorical statements, the proof or disproof of which would be of the highest importance. To illustrate: "Communist China has specific Soviet instructions to achieve in Malaya a 'Malayan People's Republic' by armed insurrection." (p. 64).

Dr. Colton's brief book contains



no new information. It is, however, an excellent popular summary, quite accurate, succinct, and judicious both in approach and in its interpretations.

D. B. SHIMKIN

Washington, D. C.

CHERNOV, VICTOR. *Pered burei* (Before the Storm). New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1953. 416 pp. \$3.00.

ZENZINOV, VLADIMIR. *Perezhitoe* (Living Memories). New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1953. 414 pp. \$3.00.

If Chernov and his party had gotten into power in 1917, instead of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Russia today would probably be a democratic federation of peasant republics, presenting no threat to the world at large.

For the greater part of their lives the authors of these memoirs fought autocracy by every means at their command, in order to bring about a free socialist society. The Revolution, however, followed a different pattern of development from the one they were anticipating, and before long it produced a far more authoritarian state than the one it replaced. Both authors became exiles after the Bolshevik Revolution and to the end of their lives were bitter opponents of the new tyranny.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party came into being about 1902. It was the outgrowth of the revolutionary *narodnik* movement of the 1870's. Common to all phases of this movement were two ideas: 1) Russia does not have to pass through the same capitalist stages of development as

the West; 2) it would be possible for Russia to achieve socialism through the development of the village commune and the workers' artels. These ideas were originally expressed by Herzen and were subsequently developed by P. Lavrov and Mikhailovsky. Victor Chernov's contribution was to combine Western European socialism with the native *narodnik* movement.

Victor Chernov (1873-1952) was the acknowledged leader and theoretician of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Vladimir Zenzinov (1880-1953) was also one of the "generals," a member of the Central Committee of the Party, as well as a member of its "fighting" or terrorist organization. Both played important rôles after the February Revolution, Zenzinov as a member of the Petrograd Soviet, Chernov, as a member of the Provisional government and later as Chairman of the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. After its dissolution, both were members of the short-lived Samara government.

Zenzinov's memoirs extend only to 1908—that was the year of the spy, Azef's, exposure, an event which nearly wrecked the Party, but which eventually, as Zenzinov shows, probably had a sobering effect on its members. Chernov's *Before the Storm* is composed of miscellaneous reminiscences, which were written in 1919 and 1920 in Moscow, where Chernov was in hiding. They extend through 1920, the year of Chernov's departure from Russia. The material was put together and edited by David Shub, after Chernov's death in New York in 1953.

There are many common characteristics in the lives and personalities of the two authors, also a few rather sharp contrasts. From

an early age both were atheists and rebels against the society in which they lived. By temperament both were romantic revolutionaries, idealistic, impulsive, and naïvely trusting in their relationships with people. Chernov was of peasant origin and came from the Volga region, where, as a child, he was free to roam the countryside. Zenzinov came from a well-to-do, cultured family of Moscow merchants. Both, however, belonged to the same class or "order," the Russian intelligentsia. Zenzinov, who was educated in German universities, Berlin and Heidelberg, was the more broadly cultured of the two and the more keenly appreciative of the Western European historical and cultural heritage. It is true, however, that Chernov too knew Western European literature well and was even something of a poet, having translated the poetry of the Belgian poet, Verhaeren. As a writer, Zenzinov's principal contributions were studies on Northern Siberia, which he knew well from first-hand experience.

A great part of Chernov's life was spent in disguise and in hiding, with false papers, trying to escape the Tsarist and later the Bolshevik police. He had many dramatic and narrow escapes. Thanks, however, to an extraordinary presence of mind, he was actually arrested only once, as a student in Moscow in 1894. Zenzinov was less fortunate; he knew the inside of some sixteen prisons and spent a number of years in exile in Siberia, from which, however, he invariably escaped.

Both volumes abound in interesting side-lights and insights into the Russian revolutionary movement. Zenzinov's volume is more intimate in tone, more deeply human and, I would say—candid. Of special in-

terest are his descriptions of the life of Russian students in German universities in the 1890's; the Russian colony in Geneva (for years the headquarters of the three revolutionary groups: the Social Democrats, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the anarchists); the various terroristic exploits; the December 1905 days in Moscow, and the blowing up of the Okhrana building, of which the author was in charge. Both authors, Chernov especially, provide fascinating characterizations of the Party "general staff": Avksentiev, Michael and Abraham Gotz, I. Bunakov-Fundaminsky, Breshko-Breshkovskaya, "the grandmother of the Russian Revolution," as well as of the leaders of the terrorist organization, Gershuni, Savinkov, and the notorious Azef.

Zenzinov, a gentle and kindly man in private life, has this to say about the practice of terror: "The high political and personal morals of the terrorists themselves were a basic characteristic of Russian political terror . . . Indeed, people who have taken upon themselves the awful weapon of murder—dagger, revolver, or dynamite—were not only the purest romantics and idealists, but were also people of the greatest moral sensitivity. They resorted to murder only after a deep spiritual struggle, only after they were convinced that all peaceful means had been exhausted . . . Morally it could be justified to the terrorist himself to a certain extent—only to a certain extent—on condition that the terrorist sacrifice his own life . . . According to the terrorist credo, his self-sacrifice could not help but fire the hearts of thousands of others who also wished to champion the cause of the general good."

In his opinion, however, propaganda was more important as a means of shattering the foundations of autocracy. "Beginning in 1904, the country was flooded with propaganda literature which came from abroad and which was reproduced by the secret presses of the two revolutionary parties. Public school teachers, male and female, university students of both sexes, gymnasium students, and the more politically conscious workers went from the cities to the country and brought the peasants new ideas, organizing among them circles which were called 'brotherhoods.'" It was these peasant "brotherhoods," which, according to Zenzinov, gave form to the peasants' discontent and helped to prepare the Revolution of 1917.

Chernov's and Zenzinov's memoirs not only make fascinating reading for the general reader, but are important basic material for the historian. It is hoped that both these volumes will be translated into English.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT  
Dartmouth College

ZENKOVSKY, V. V. *A History of Russian Philosophy*. Tr. from the Russian by George L. Kline. 2 vols. New York, Columbia University Press, 1953. 947 pp. \$15.00.

Professor Zenkovsky who has for many years taught philosophy at the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Paris, after having been forced to leave his native Russia in 1922, has written the first comprehensive study of the history of Russian philosophy. The English reading

public will be grateful to translator and publisher for making this work accessible in such a handsome edition. An older and characteristic work by the same author, *Russian Thinkers and Europe*, originally published in Russian in Paris in 1926, has been also made available in the Russian Translation Project Series of the American Council of Learned Societies. Its strictly Slavophile and only slightly attenuated anti-Western point of view will prepare the reader for the point of view of the larger work. This Slavophile flavor persists, though the author recognizes, without really carrying it through, that the time has come for the Orthodox Russians to desist from their intense preoccupation with the national originality, the *samobytnost* of the Russian folk. "The idea of a special mission for Russia was at one time creative and valuable, but it also concealed in itself the seeds of self-aggrandizement and self-isolation." The critical Western reader may be permitted to remark that the danger by far outweighed, very much to the damage of Russia, any value which the Slavophile attitude might have held.

This in no way detracts from the value of the present work as an introduction to, and a survey of, many thinkers unknown in the West. The completeness of the presentation is especially remarkable. It represents the fruit of the work of many years. It should not be overlooked that the term philosophy is very loosely used in Russian and corresponds much more to what the Germans call *Weltanschauung* than to scholarly philosophy in the West. Men who would be regarded in the West as publicists and essayists dealing

vaguely with the general problem of history and society, especially Russian history and society, or with the criticism of life and letters—men like Belinsky, Chaadaev and Herzen, Lavrov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy—are regarded as philosophers and treated as such. Only in the twentieth century, after Vladimir Solovyov, can it be claimed that philosophy, as understood in the West, began in Russia. Thus the book is rather an introduction to general Russian thought than a history of Russian philosophy. But it is one of its merits that it relates this thought to the general conditions of Russian life and thus becomes an attempt at an intellectual history of modern Russia, though always from the point of view of an Orthodox Slavophile, whose views have however been mellowed and tempered by his knowledge of Europe and by the recognition that some of the worst features of Bolshevism had their roots in the anti-Western tradition of Russia and their rejection of a liberal society based upon law.

HANS KOHN

*City College of New York*

KUCHEROV, SAMUEL. *Courts, Lawyers and Trials under the Last Three Tsars*. Foreword by Michael Karpovich. New York, Frederick Praeger, 1953. 339 pp. \$6.00.

This is a very informative book covering a much wider field than its title indicates. It has a special interest for historians since it describes the judicial order before the Reform with references even to medieval Russian law of the fif-

teenth and sixteenth centuries. It relates many interesting details concerning the Reform itself, the various doubts and hesitations of legislators, and the subsequent changes. The explanation of the terminology of ancient Russian law, *gubnye starosty*, *tselevalniki*, *Raspravnyaya Palata*, etc., as well as documentation from various codes and laws, as original sources for references, will undoubtedly be useful for specialists in Russian history. This work can be recommended to those studying law for it describes Russian law on the basis of a comparative method and with comments of theoretical character. The various jury systems, the organization of the bar, and the principles of professional ethics are expounded in a form and with details of particular interest for every student of law. And finally the reports concerning eight political trials and several conflicts between the administration and the bar, to which more than a third of the book is devoted, are valuable pages for everyone who is interested in the social and political life in Russia on the eve of the Revolution.

The book under review may be appraised also from a more general point of view. The judicial reform of November 20, 1864, was one of the most important of the Great Reforms of Alexander II. It stimulated further progress and, as the author has justly noted, "may serve as an example of the possibility of producing radical, almost miraculous changes for the better in the administration of justice."

The judicial power in Russia as it was established according to the Laws of 1864 was based on democratic principles, humanity, respect for human dignity, and freedom of

speech for the defendants. The jury system and bar were organized as part of the effective apparatus of justice. There were a few sceptics who were unable to imagine that it was possible to eradicate the various defects of the pre-Reform organization of justice, its extreme dilatoriness, the venality of judges, their personal arbitrariness and complete dependence upon the executive power. After describing the Reform with a series of illustrations and references in his Introduction, the author later quotes some of the sceptics themselves. One of them, Ivan Aksakov, published an article in 1884 in defense of the Reform, in which he stated: "The fact that the contemporary judges do not accept bribes, that one can approach them without presents, that poverty is not a vice in the eyes of the court, that there is equal justice for the poor and oppressed and for the rich and noble—this fact at the present time is known in all corners of Russia, to every peasant on the immeasurable expanse of our country."

Even after the Reform there were still some doubts about the expediency of the organization of the jury (see, for example, the satirical poem "Potok Bogatyr" by Count Alexei Tolstoy), yet the Senate expressed high appreciation of the activities of the jury: "The jurors who were called from . . . the masses . . . very soon became familiar with the moral concept and ideas which are inherent in every developed society. . . . They became conscious of the ideal interests pursued by the criminal court."

There was a prejudice against the bar as a source of faction and revolution but it was organized, and Russian lawyers wholly justified the confidence of the legislation. From

the beginning there were many outstanding jurists of high moral quality, defenders of the rights of the individual who were worthy co-partners of the eminent judges in administering justice.

All these data might be used as a convincing example of the way in which a good law can re-educate people and improve the conditions of social life in a comparatively short time. There are many sceptics who do not believe that it will be possible to replace the arbitrary, corrupt, and anti-humane Soviet administration with democratic institutions, who assert that the Russian people are not prepared for a democratic régime and are doomed to be subject to one or another system of autocracy. The Judicial Reform of 1864 demonstrated very well that a legal reform may be successful if it corresponds to the needs of the nation. It also showed that everyone understood what it means to have rights well protected against any violations; for example, the independence of the judiciary personnel and freedom of speech in court.

Mr. Kuchеров was a lawyer in Russia during the pre-revolutionary period but he does not describe his personal experiences. His work is grounded on a conscientious study of the numerous documents and a rich literature. His approach is quite objective and the reader will agree with him that "never, even in the darkest years of reaction, did the Russian court sink to the level of Soviet justice." Little wonder that Mr. Vyshinsky vilifies and tries to blacken the pre-revolutionary judicial system. He characterized the Judicial Reform of 1864 as having the purpose of serving "more effectively the cause of exploitation and oppression of the



working population, insuring better than did the old court the defense and protection of the nobility and of the young bourgeoisie . . ." and, contrary to all facts, he wrote that "the bar was a bourgeois institution, which shared the fate of the bourgeoisie." This is a shameless slander applied by Mr. Vyshinsky with the purpose of justifying the destruction of the Reform of 1864 and the abolition of the free Russian lawyer by the October Revolution.

It is hardly necessary or possible to refer to all the valuable materials which a reader may find in the book under review. But certainly it was not possible for the author to exhaust the subject. From the historical point of view it would be but natural to expect from such a study at least a short survey of the peculiarity of the development of Russian law. The cultural significance of the judicial reform becomes still more obvious when one considers the fact that there was no science of law in Russia up to the time of the Great Reforms and that by the end of the nineteenth century many Russian scholars became recognized authorities in the field of Roman law, international, criminal and civil law. Many generations of the Russian intelligentsia had ignored or neglected law as a foundation of society; they looked for "inner truth" like the Slavophiles, or for moral perfection, like Leo Tolstoy. The Judicial Reform awakened legal consciousness and educated people to respect legal institutions. On the other hand, from a purely juridical point of view certain readers would like to find in a book on courts, lawyers and trials not only data on political trials and criminal cases but at least a short characterization of some famous Russian civilists

such as Isachenko, Kazařinov, Lednicki, Passover, Teslenko, Vas-kovsky and Vinaver. But such remarks are always possible, and the fact that it is a good book makes one wish for more.

Only a man devoted to the rule of law and to the principles of justice could write such a work, which undoubtedly required a long and conscientious study of the literature and legal sources. He has described most eloquently both the positive and negative phenomena of the past and one can share his sentiments in deploring the forcible destruction of pre-revolutionary justice.

G. C. GUINS

*University of California*

MEYER, PETER; WEINRYB, BERNARD D.; DUSCHINSKY, EUGENE; and SYLVAIN, NICOLAS. *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*. Ithaca, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1953. 638 pp. \$6.50.

This book is a companion volume to that of Solomon Schwartz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, 1951. It completes a project organized by the Library of Information of the American Jewish Committee "to obtain an organized body of knowledge, based on a critical examination of all available sources, on the Communist attitude toward Jewish problems and the effect of the Soviet system on Jewish life." The book was written by four authorities on Eastern Europe and on Jewish life and culture there, and, since all of these scholars are natives of central and eastern Europe, it reflects personal knowledge of the area and its problems. Peter Meyer wrote the

long introductory essay and the chapters on Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, Bernard Weinryb those on Poland and on the part of Poland incorporated into the USSR, Eugene Duschinsky that on Hungary, and Nicolas Sylvain that on Rumania. The book suffers somewhat from this national approach, with the chapters naturally of uneven quality, that on Czechoslovakia being the best. It also suffers from the inevitable decision of its authors to skip lightly over the Nazi period in Eastern Europe, which began the destruction of Jewish life and culture there and which was more than a prelude to the period from 1945 into the spring of 1953, which this volume surveys. As a matter of fact, the Nazi impact is almost ignored in this volume.

In many ways, this is an extraordinary book. The authors clearly have collected data from all available sources and arranged those data into "an organized body of knowledge." Their analyses of the butchery, massacre, and persecution of the Jews in Eastern Europe are extraordinarily objective and dispassionate, and the reader occasionally has to check himself, even in this hardened age, to realize that he is reading about human beings and about atrocities which make those of Nero and the Inquisition pale in comparison. This objectivity constitutes a genuine merit in a book which studies a problem of such burning human interest. Indeed, it may be that the book is too cold and impersonal. It lacks the human touch, and there is no sense of personal tragedy and loss. As a description of the obliteration of a whole civilization, or of a series of civilizations, the volume does fail to persuade the reader that, after all,

millions of people, millions of Sarahs and Jacobs were involved, and that a way of life important to us all has been smothered and destroyed. One wonders whether the student of Soviet affairs does not acquire the coldness and impersonality of the system he studies and the press and documents he uses. We may all soon cease to be outraged by simple facts, such as the decline of the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia from 356,000 in 1930 to 17,000 in 1951, which would have stirred our Victorian predecessors to a degree almost unimaginable now.

For an historian who has struggled with inadequate Russian and Eastern European statistics of various kinds, the statistical data included in this book are astounding. They reflect solid and detailed scholarship from all kinds of sources. One is told not only how many Jews there were in each of the countries of Eastern Europe during various years within the first half of this century, but one finds, done to the one-hundredth of one percent, the proportion of Jews who were clerks in Czechoslovakia in 1930; the number of Jews in Hungary who were baptized in 1938; and the numbers of Jews who were deported from Budapest in the spring of 1951. The entire volume is a convincing demonstration of the amount of information careful and conscientious scholars can obtain through use of the Soviet and Satellite press and other publications. It represents in some ways an immense hole in the Iron Curtain.

This volume also adds another chapter in our growing understanding of the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet pattern described here for each country with regard to "restitution" of Jewish

property, relief and rehabilitation, Jewish education, the Jewish communities and communal life, regimentation, emigration, purges, and trials is one that was laid down for the entire area. However, the Jews have suffered more bitterly and cruelly than any of the other peoples, and the Bratislava riot in 1948, the Kielce pogrom in 1946, the

deportations from Hungary after 1951, and the general smothering of all Jewish culture and individuality are all reminders that the world has stepped further down toward 1984 and utter darkness than it had even in the dark days of the 1930's and the years of World War II.

ROBERT F. BYRNES

*Washington, D. C.*

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